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PREJUDICIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE:
HOW THE CIRCUITS APPLY OLD CHIEF
TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403
Hannah J. Goldman*
It is a fundamental principle of the American justice system that a
defendant should be judged on the facts of the case at issue and not for the
defendant’s general character or past indiscretions. Federal Rule of
Evidence 404, which prohibits character evidence, addresses this issue.
Rule 403 represents another principle of the justice system: the legal
system favors admissibility of evidence over its exclusion. There are some
exceptions to this principle, including when evidence is so highly
prejudicial that it outweighs the benefits of its admission. As 404(b)
character evidence is almost always highly prejudicial to the defendant,
trial judges are often asked to use their discretion to decide when to admit
404(b) evidence.
The lower courts often have been inconsistent when applying Rule 403 to
404(b) evidence. Understanding when to admit or exclude 404(b) evidence
becomes more complicated when the defendant offers to concede to a point
so that the prosecution does not need to introduce 404(b) evidence in order
to prove it. In Old Chief v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed this issue. The holding, however, was narrowly tailored to its
facts and provided little guidance in other cases. In addition, the Court
introduced new concepts for trial judges to consider when deciding whether
to admit 404(b) evidence. This Note examines the discrepancies in lower
courts’ methods for admitting 404(b) evidence in light of Old Chief and
offers a unifying and comprehensive test for trial judges to use when faced
with this issue.
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INTRODUCTION
Johnny Lynn Old Chief was a convicted felon.1 He served a little more
than seven years in prison on two separate charges, including assault
resulting in serious bodily injury.2 On October 23, 1993, he was once again
arrested for his alleged role in a drunken fight that resulted in a gunshot
putting a hole in the fender of someone’s car.3 There was contradicting
evidence on who fired the shot, but the gun belonged to a friend of Old
Chief’s and only one fingerprint was found on the pistol, which did not

1. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174–75 (1997).
2. D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and
“Legitimate Moral Force”: Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 447–49 (1998).
3. Id. at 403. No one was injured. Id.
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belong to Old Chief.4 Old Chief was subsequently charged with assault
with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during a crime of
violence.5 As a convicted felon, he also was charged as a felon in
possession of a firearm.6 With such weak evidence against him, Old Chief
pled not guilty.7
One of the elements of a felon-in-possession charge is that the defendant
has a prior felony conviction.8 Old Chief’s plea of not guilty put his
convicted felon status at issue in the case, requiring the prosecution to prove
the status element beyond a reasonable doubt.9 To prove the convicted
felon status, the prosecution chose the prior conviction that most closely
resembled the current charge, putting “a powerful weapon in the
prosecution’s hands to introduce evidence of the sort generally explicitly
forbidden by the propensity rule.”10 Old Chief was left in a catch-22: he
had a strong case that he was not guilty, but by so pleading, he opened the
door for the prosecution to introduce his prior conviction to the jury.11 By
pleading not guilty at trial, the jury learned that Old Chief had previously
committed the same crime for which he was currently charged.12
This evidence may well have dispelled the jury’s doubt about whether
Old Chief ever possessed the gun or used it on that day, practically sealing
his fate.13 In an attempt to avoid this outcome, Old Chief’s defense counsel
offered to stipulate to the prior felony status element of the conviction.14
The prosecution refused to accept the stipulation, and the district court
allowed the evidence of Old Chief’s prior assault conviction as permissible
404(b) evidence to prove an element of the crime.15 Old Chief was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison.16
The importance of Rule 404(b) cannot be overstated. Numerous studies
show that the effects on a jury of admitting 404(b) evidence are virtually

4. Id. at 446–48.
5. Id. at 448.
6. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174–75.
7. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 450–51.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Almost any prior felony conviction will do, but
there are some qualifications. See infra notes 149, 193 and accompanying text.
9. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 419. A plea of not guilty puts every element of an
offense at issue for the prosecution to prove. See id.
10. Id. at 420. The “propensity rule” refers to Federal Rule of Evidence 404, which
explains when evidence of one’s prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts are permitted or
prohibited at trial. FED. R. EVID. 404. Rule 404(a) generally prohibits the prosecution from
admitting a defendant’s prior criminal convictions if the defendant does not testify. See id.
Rule 404(b)(2) explains when evidence, otherwise prohibited under Rule 404(a) as character
evidence, may nevertheless be permissible to prove certain elements of the crime with which
the defendant is charged. See id. This Note refers to this type of evidence as “404(b)
evidence.”
11. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 450–51.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 175 (1997).
15. Id. at 177.
16. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 448. This sentence was later vacated and remanded.
See id. at 448 n.110.

284

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

irreversible,17 regardless of any limiting instruction the judge issues to the
jury.18 While it has long been a staple of the U.S. judicial system to judge a
defendant only for the act for which he is charged, and not for the person he
appears to be,19 it is human nature to look at a person’s character when
deciding his guilt. In Old Chief’s case, the trial judge concluded that there
was a permissible purpose for the 404(b) evidence, but that does not answer
the question of whether the evidence should have passed the Rule 403
balancing test and ultimately been admitted at trial.20
Scholars and courts have hotly debated Rule 404 since its inception.21
The circuit courts have never agreed on when to allow 404(b) evidence at
trial.22 This is especially true when a judge is faced with a defense offer to
stipulate to an element of the crime that 404(b) evidence purportedly
addresses.23 Under Rule 403, the trial judge must decide whether to admit
404(b) evidence by weighing the probative value of the evidence against its
potential prejudicial effect.24 This balancing methodology is often where
lower courts differ. The divergence among the circuits’ interpretation of
these rules has become even more pronounced over the last eighteen years.

17. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 1:41 (4th ed. 2013); see also Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other
Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 (1961) [hereinafter Other Crimes]; Daniel C. Richman, Old
Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV.
939, 944–45 (1997) (suggesting that a juror who learns about a defendant’s prior bad acts
might believe the defendant is more likely to have committed the crime in question, demand
less of the government either consciously or subconsciously, or, if unsure about guilt, lean
toward convicting the defendant for reasons of convenience).
18. For purposes of this Note, a “limiting instruction” is a type of explanation that trial
judges give to the jury to explain that it may only use certain evidence to make definitive,
limited conclusions. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
§ 9:73–74 (2008).
19. See Other Crimes, supra note 17, at 776–77. Over a century ago, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that bad act evidence
tend[s] to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from
the real issue, and to produce the impression that [the defendants] were wretches
whose lives were of no value to the community, and who were not entitled to the
full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for the trial of human beings.
Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892).
20. This Note discusses the admissibility of 404(b) evidence, and specifically focuses on
when a court should permit 404(b) evidence at trial and when it should exclude the evidence
for failure to pass the Rule 403 balancing test.
21. See Stephanie Yost, Note, Reversals of Fortune: How the Ninth Circuit Reviews
Erroneously Admitted “Other Acts” Evidence Under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 23
SW. U. L. REV. 661, 661 (1994) (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30
VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1467 (1985)).
22. See infra Parts I.B, II.
23. See infra Parts I.B, II. While the defense may offer to stipulate to—or concede—an
element of a crime in order to avoid the admission of 404(b) evidence, the prosecution need
not accept the offer, leaving the trial judge with discretion to proceed with the evidence
under a Rule 403 balancing test. See infra Parts I.B, II. For purposes of this Note, a
stipulation refers to a defense offer to stipulate, not an official evidentiary admission. When
a trial court accepts a proffered stipulation, the stipulation manifests itself in a “must
convict” jury instruction. See infra Part I.B.3.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note.
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In 1997, in Old Chief v. United States,25 Old Chief’s case was brought to
the U.S. Supreme Court. In Old Chief, the Court overturned the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that the prosecution must accept a
defense offer to stipulate to the status element because the prior
conviction’s prejudicial effect outweighs its probative worth under Rule
403.26 Lower courts have interpreted the Court’s holding in Old Chief in
various ways, and a majority of circuits continue to afford the trial judge
broad discretion when ruling on the admissibility of 404(b) evidence.27
This Note explores the different ways lower courts use the Rule 403
balancing test to determine the admissibility of 404(b) evidence at trial in
the face of alternative evidence. Part I of this Note focuses on the
background of Rules 404 and 403 and how courts have interpreted these
rules differently, resulting in inconsistent admissions of 404(b) evidence.
This part also analyzes the degree to which lower courts in the 1980s and
1990s weighed the probative value of 404(b) evidence against its
prejudicial effect when alternative evidence was available,28 concluding
with a discussion of the 1997 Supreme Court decision of Old Chief. Part II
discusses how Old Chief affected circuit courts’ interpretations of the Rule
403 balancing test with regard to 404(b) evidence. This part analyzes how
circuits interpret Old Chief in different ways, resulting in a more divided
circuit landscape. It demonstrates how some circuits interpret Old Chief to
overrule its 404(b) admissibility jurisprudence in spite of available
alternative evidence, and it shows how some circuits interpret Old Chief to
further its method of Rule 403 balancing, whether or not the court’s method
is permissive of 404(b) evidence under these circumstances. Finally, Part
III of this Note explores how courts might better understand Old Chief and
presents a unified Rule 403 balancing test for admitting 404(b) evidence in
light of the teachings of Old Chief.
I. OLD CHIEF IN CONTEXT: UNDERSTANDING HOW THE COURT CAME TO
ITS RULE 403 HOLDING ON 404(B) ADMISSIBILITY AND STIPULATIONS
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the Old Chief decision.
Part I.A discusses Rules 404 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
analyzes how they intersect. Then, Part I.B addresses the different ways
that a defendant may seek to exclude relevant and otherwise permissible
404(b) evidence and how the circuits approached these possibilities prior to
Old Chief. Finally, Part I.C presents a thorough analysis of the Old Chief
opinion.

25. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
26. Id. at 191–92.
27. This Note analyzes whether 404(b) evidence is admissible under Rule 403, and
assumes, unless otherwise asserted, that the other acts evidence in question has a permissible
404(b) purpose.
28. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring lower courts to engage in this balancing test).
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A. Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 403
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 197229 and, in the decade
following, no individual evidence rule generated more reported court
decisions than Rule 404(b).30 Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of a
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the character,”31 essentially barring the use of other acts evidence to
show a person has a propensity to act in a certain way.32 The second
sentence of Rule 404(b), however, permits the use of other acts evidence for
other nonpropensity purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.”33 The advisory committee’s notes state that there is no
“mechanical solution” for when to admit or bar 404(b) evidence, but rather,
under the Rule 403 balancing test, a judge must consider the availability of
other means of proof before determining whether to permit the evidence.34
Thus, in order for 404(b) evidence to be permissible, it not only needs to
fall under the “permissible uses” in 404(b), but it also must survive the Rule
403 balancing test.
As mentioned above, Rule 403 provides that courts may exclude
otherwise relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”35 The advisory committee
defined “unfair prejudice” as a “tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly . . . an emotional one,” or to use evidence for an

29. FED. R. EVID. historical note.
30. See Yost, supra note 21, at 661.
31. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
32. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note (stating that 404(b) “deals with
a specialized but important application of the general rule excluding circumstantial use of
character evidence” (emphasis added)); DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENCE
OF OTHER MISCONDUCT AND SIMILAR EVENTS § 1.2 (2009).
33. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
34. Id. advisory committee’s note. It should be noted that before even reaching this
point, the evidence must be relevant under Rule 401. Rule 401 states that “[e]vidence is
relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R.
EVID. 401. Notably, for Rule 401 relevancy purposes, it does not matter if other means of
proof exist or if the element the evidence would be used to prove is at issue in the case—that
is what the Rule 403 balancing test is for. See id. advisory committee’s note (“The fact to
which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute. While situations will arise which call
for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove a point conceded by the opponent, the ruling
should be made on the basis of such considerations [under Rule 403] . . . rather than under
any general requirement that evidence is admissible only if directed to matters in dispute.”).
35. FED. R. EVID. 403. In the Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
drafters required the exclusion of evidence that is outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice
and provided for judicial discretion—as in the Rule’s current form—for exclusion involving
undue delay, waste of time, or cumulative evidence. See Kathryn Cameron Walton, Note, An
Exercise in Sound Discretion: Old Chief v. United States, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1053, 1066–67
(1998). Upon the recommendation of the Department of Justice, this draft was rejected as
virtually unreviewable due to the ambiguity of phrases like “substantially outweighed” and
“undue prejudice” and the threat that trial courts would classify evidence to fit the demands
of the rule. See id.
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impermissible purpose.36 Furthermore, it is proper to consider other means
of proof in weighing the probative value of the evidence against the
potential for unfair prejudice.37 In other words, while the advisory
committee’s notes to Rule 404(b) paint it as a rule of inclusion,38 the
drafters crafted Rule 403 to address, among other things, the concerns that
are inherent in admitting 404(b) evidence.39
What can a defendant do when the government wants to admit 404(b)
evidence—such as a prior conviction—for a permissible purpose, such as to
prove knowledge? One option is to offer to stipulate to the fact that the
defendant has the requisite knowledge to commit the crime with which he is
charged, conceding that the prosecution no longer needs to prove
knowledge.40 Another option is to not dispute the element at trial, thereby
conceding that it is proved on its face.41 Lastly, the defense can request that
the judge instruct the jury that if all the elements other than knowledge are
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury “must convict”42 the
defendant.43
The theory behind each of these options is premised on reducing or
eliminating the probative value of the 404(b) evidence to such an extent that
Rule 403 requires the court to exclude the evidence as insufficiently
probative to justify its cumulative effect or high degree of prejudice.44 If
the prosecution still wants to use the prior conviction to prove knowledge,
the advisory committee notes require the trial judge to consider these
alternative methods of proof, which may be less prejudicial to the
defendant.45 The degree to which circuit courts considered these alternative
methods, and the degree to which the courts believed they reduced the
probative value of the evidence, varied widely, resulting in the admissibility
of 404(b) evidence in some circuits and exclusion in others.46

36. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note.
37. See id.
38. See LEONARD, supra note 32, § 4.3.2.
39. See Yost, supra note 21, at 669.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 753 (2d Cir. 1979); see also infra
Part I.B.1.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1978); see also infra
Part I.B.2.
42. For a description of “must convict” jury instructions, see supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder (Crowder I), 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en
banc), vacated, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), rev’d en banc, 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see
also infra Part I.B.3. These three methods are not mutually exclusive.
44. See Daniel J. Buzzetta, Note, Balancing the Scales: Limiting the Prejudicial Effect
of Evidence Rule 404(b) Through Stipulation, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 389, 392 (1994).
45. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note; see also Buzzetta, supra note 44, at
407–08.
46. See infra Parts I.B, II. Rule 403 left the decision to admit potentially unfair
prejudicial evidence to the judge by stating purposefully broad categories for exclusion,
requiring a discretionary balancing of probative worth against prejudicial value. See Donnie
L. Kidd, Jr., Pretending to Upset the Balance: Old Chief v. United States and Exclusion of
Prior Felony Conviction Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
231, 237 (1998).
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In reviewing the circuits’ approaches to dealing with these methods,
judges and commentators have analyzed divisions among the lower courts
in different ways. For instance, prior to Old Chief, the D.C. Circuit divided
the Third and Fifth Circuits into one camp, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits into another, and the First, Second, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits into a third.47 Meanwhile, one commentator split the Sixth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits into one camp and the First, Fourth, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits into another.48 The Eighth Circuit was cited on both sides of the
debate, indicating inconsistent application of the law even within a single
circuit.49
B. How Defendants Can Attempt to Exclude 404(b) Evidence
Circuit courts have responded inconsistently to the available methods that
defense teams use to convince a trial judge to exclude 404(b) evidence.
Some circuits factored proffered stipulations into their balancing test and
some did not.50 Some believed that a stipulation or not bringing the
element into issue at trial, coupled with a jury instruction, required
excluding 404(b) evidence, while others did not.51 Notably, alleged errors
in admission of 404(b) evidence formed the most common ground for
appeal in many jurisdictions.52 Circuit courts therefore have become “a
crucial battleground in the fight to limit district judges’ discretion in
applying this rule.”53 This section discusses the different approaches lower

47. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1409–10; see also Richard M. Thompson II, The Perfect
Storm: Rule 404(b), Unequivocal Stipulations, and Old Chief’s Dicta on Narrative Integrity
and Evidentiary Richness, 37 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 55, 64–65 (2011).
48. Scott Patterson, Old Chief v. United States: Radical Change or Minor Departure?
How Much Further Will Courts Go in Limiting the Prosecution’s Ability to Try Its Case?, 49
MERCER L. REV. 855, 857–59 (1998).
49. Compare United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1975), abrogated by
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding that the government is not required
to accept a defendant’s stipulation in lieu of 404(b) evidence), with United States v. Jenkins,
7 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 1993), overruling recognized by United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d
947, 952 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that 404(b) evidence is permissible to prove intent if the
defendant’s theory is that he was not part of the alleged crime at all), and United States v.
Thomas, 58 F.3d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1995) (overruling the district court’s decision to
prohibit 404(b) evidence because a defense stipulation took it out of the dispute on the
grounds that Jenkins sets a high bar and the stipulation was not made with sufficient clarity).
50. See infra Part II.B.1; see also United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 338–39 (11th
Cir. 1994) (“Further, where the defendant offers to stipulate to the issue the government
seeks to prove, evidence of prior convictions is inadmissible.” (citing United States v. Costa,
947 F.2d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 1991))); United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690–92 (9th
Cir. 1993) (“A stipulation thus has no place in the Rule 403 balancing process.”), abrogated
by Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190–91; United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 754 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“The record must reflect, as it does here, an unequivocal concession of the element by the
defendant. Once that offer is made, the other-crime evidence should be excluded.”).
51. See infra Part II.B.2; see also United States v. Mounts, 35 F.3d 1208, 1217 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that exclusion of evidence is not required when there is a sufficient jury
instruction); United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1421 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
“evidence is not relevant to an issue” if the issue is not disputed).
52. See Yost, supra note 21, at 662.
53. Id.
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courts used in dealing with each of these three methods prior to the Old
Chief decision.54
1. Defense Offers to Stipulate
A defendant may offer to stipulate to exclude 404(b) evidence that does
not directly relate to the currently charged crime.55 A sufficient stipulation
may diminish the probative value of the 404(b) evidence to the point that it
no longer outweighs its prejudicial effect under a Rule 403 balancing test.56
In United States v. Mohel,57 a leading decision on this method, defendant
Michael Mohel was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.58 Nelson Griffith was a cooperating witness for the prosecution
and provided the most damaging evidence against Mohel.59 Against
vigorous objection by the defense, Griffith testified that shortly after his
arrest, he told Mohel that he had heard that Mohel had been ripped off by
two men in jail, and that Mohel responded, “if he [hadn’t been] ripped off
he would have been something.”60 Agent Swint, who arrested Mohel,
testified that when he told Mohel that he knew Mohel had been ripped off
for cocaine in the past, Mohel replied, “I don’t know how I can help you in
that area. The two individuals that I was fronting for are no longer in the
country.”61 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that these two statements
suggesting Mohel’s previous involvement with cocaine were inadmissible
404(b) evidence.62
The government argued that the evidence was admissible to prove
Mohel’s knowledge of the cocaine and intent to sell it, two necessary
elements of the crime charged.63 The record left no doubt, however, that
the defense sought to remove intent and knowledge from the case.64 The
defense’s theory was that the alleged sale was a complete fabrication and
that Griffith was a liar, and therefore, defense counsel repeatedly offered to
stipulate to the elements of intent and knowledge.65 The defense conceded
that if the jury found that Mohel had in fact sold the cocaine, then there was
no need to prove knowledge or intent.66 Both at pretrial conference and on
the first day of the trial, the defense counsel informed the court that it would
not dispute the elements of knowledge and intent and that if the jury found

54. For a discussion of the circuits’ varying approaches in the aftermath of Old Chief,
see infra Part II.
55. See David A. Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of Intent in the
Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 242 (2011).
56. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
57. 604 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1979).
58. See id. at 750.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 751.
62. See id. at 755 (reversing the conviction and remanding for a new trial).
63. See id. at 751.
64. See id. at 752.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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that the alleged transaction took place, knowledge and intent could be
inferred from the transaction.67
The defense argued that because knowledge and intent were not at issue
at trial, the 404(b) evidence was inadmissible.68 The Second Circuit agreed
that “[s]uch an unequivocal offer of stipulation” removed the elements as
issues in the case.69
The Second Circuit further held that a written stipulation was not
necessary, but rather it was enough for the defense to “unequivocally offer[]
the concession and then act[] accordingly.”70 As the defense took this
approach in Mohel, the court held that the government could not evade the
defense’s unequivocal offer to stipulate to intent and knowledge for the
purpose of creating a dispute that would give the 404(b) evidence a
permissible purpose for admission.71
The Second Circuit revisited its holding in Mohel a decade later, in
United States v. Colon.72 The issue on appeal in Colon was whether
testimony was properly admitted concerning two prior occasions in which
Onel Colon, the defendant, had participated in the sale of heroin.73 As in
Mohel, the government argued that the evidence was admissible to prove
knowledge and intent.74 The court examined Colon’s defense theories at
trial in order to determine whether the 404(b) evidence had been properly
admitted.75
The defense counsel posited two opposing theories: first, that Colon
gestured to the undercover officer that he might find drugs down the street,
but not to the dealer in particular;76 second, that Colon did not remember
ever being approached by the undercover officer.77 Because the defense
was unsure prior to trial which theory it would pursue, the trial judge
permitted the 404(b) evidence.78

67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 753 (figuring that because “other crimes evidence is inadmissible to prove
intent when that issue is not really in dispute,” the evidence is inadmissible (quoting United
States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1978))).
70. Id. at 754.
71. See id. at 754. The court emphasized that “[t]he record must reflect, as it does here,
an unequivocal concession of the element by the defendant. Once that offer is made, the
other-crime evidence should be excluded.” Id.
72. 880 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989).
73. See id. at 653.
74. See id. at 654.
75. See id. at 653. The case revolved around Colon’s involvement in the sale of heroin
and whether he facilitated a drug sale to an undercover officer by pointing the officer in the
direction of the dealer down the street. See id.
76. See id. at 654. On this theory, the trial judge allowed the evidence, finding that it
could be used to prove intent. See id.
77. See id. The defense argued that, under this theory, knowledge and intent would not
be at issue, because the only question would be whether the interaction between Colon and
the officer happened in the first place. See id. The defense was prepared to concede that if
the jury found that the officer had approached Colon, then the elements of knowledge and
intent could be considered proven. See id. at 658–59.
78. See id. at 655.
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The Second Circuit reversed.79 While the court agreed that the evidence
would be admissible to prove intent if the defense argued that Colon
innocently directed the officer toward the dealer, the court was convinced
that the defense argued the second theory and that, as in Mohel, the offer to
stipulate to intent removed the issue from the case.80 The stipulation in
Colon was much less explicit than the one in Mohel, but the court
nevertheless found that changing the defense theory reaffirmed the
defendant’s proffered stipulation.81
Mohel and Colon are two examples of the Second Circuit’s approach to
dealing with stipulations: if defense counsel offers to stipulate to an
element of the crime which the prosecution claims the 404(b) evidence
proves, and the stipulation suffices to remove the issue from the case, the
trial judge should exclude the evidence. This approach does not label the
evidence irrelevant under Rule 401; rather, it diminishes the probative value
of the evidence so that, under Rule 403, the evidence’s prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value.82
Prior to Old Chief, other circuits adopted the Second Circuit’s approach.
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, followed a rule that prohibited the
prosecution from introducing 404(b) evidence to prove an element of a
crime if the defense has offered to stipulate to the element.83 Similar to the
Second Circuit, the stipulation must sufficiently remove the element as an
issue in the case.84 The First85 and D.C.86 Circuits also took similar
approaches to defense offers to stipulate. For example, in United States v.
Crowder87 (Crowder I), the D.C. Circuit held that “[w]hile a defendant’s
concession or offer to stipulate is not ‘proof,’ it may serve the same
function, and the trial judge should factor it into the 403 balance. That is
the analysis the Advisory Committee envisioned, and it is one this court has
endorsed.”88
79. See id. at 656.
80. See id. at 658–59.
81. See id. at 659.
82. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997) (citing the Federal Rules of
Evidence and holding that exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence must be based on the
Rule 403 balancing test); see also infra Part I.C.1.
83. See United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 338 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing United States
v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 1991)).
84. See id. at 339. In Taylor, the defense’s proffered stipulation to intent was
insufficient because the prosecution wanted to introduce the 404(b) evidence to prove
knowledge, motive, and absence of mistake as well, and thus, the 404(b) evidence still had
high probative value on issues not stipulated. See id.
85. See United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that
forcing the prosecution to accept a stipulation to the status element in a felon-in-possession
case does not weaken the prosecution’s argument).
86. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d 1405, 1407–10 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 U.S.
1087 (1997), rev’d en banc 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the 404(b)
evidence offered by the prosecution to prove intent and knowledge “is inadmissible because
the defendant’s concession of intent and knowledge deprives the evidence of any value other
than what Rule 404(b) . . . unambiguously prohibits”).
87. 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), rev’d en
banc 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
88. Id. at 1422–23 (citation omitted).
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Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit took the absolute opposite view. In United
States v. Breitkreutz,89 the court emphatically held that the government is
permitted to admit 404(b) evidence despite an explicit and unequivocal
offer to stipulate to the proffered element.90 The court reasoned that a
defense stipulation does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving
every element of the crime.91 Further, the court held that the defense “goes
astray in presuming that a proffered stipulation is an alternative means of
proof which the district court should consider in its [Rule] 403
balancing. . . . A stipulation is not proof . . . [and] has no place in the Rule
403 balancing process.”92
2. Element Not Contested
The idea behind stipulating to an element of a crime is that the element is
no longer at issue in the case. Similarly, the defendant can remove an issue
in a case by not contesting it at trial.93 The defense theory is that if the
element is not contested, the facts of the case will speak for themselves, and
the jury will hold that the element is proved.94 There are some crimes, for
example, where a mental element of the crime will be inferred from the act
of the crime itself if the mental element is not contested.95
Under these circumstances, the Second Circuit once again adopted a
novel position. In United States v. Figueroa,96 the court held that if the
prosecution wants to offer 404(b) evidence to prove elements such as
knowledge or intent, then it may only do so at the conclusion of the
defendant’s case.97 This approach allows the trial judge to determine if the
issue the evidence is supposed to prove is actually in dispute before
weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect.98 In a similar
vein, if the prosecution seeks to admit 404(b) evidence under another
rubric, such as identity or common scheme, then—absent a defense theory
that the defendant did not commit the alleged act—the evidence may be
89. 8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172
(1997).
90. See id. at 690–91 (finding that a court cannot compel the prosecution to accept a
stipulation because it would allow the defendant to “plead out” an element of the offense).
91. See id. at 690 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991)).
92. See id. at 691–92.
93. See United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1421 (2d Cir. 1993) (“In some
circumstances the very nature of a defense put forward by the defendant may itself remove
an issue from a case.”).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Payne, No. 93-5381, 1994 WL 36849, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb.
8, 1994) (“Because of the large amount of crack cocaine in defendant’s possession and the
evidence that this amount had an approximate street value of $1,700, there was sufficient
evidence from which a jury could properly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had an intent to distribute the crack cocaine.”).
95. See supra notes 93–94; see also Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 249 (“Thus, by
merely proving the actus reus in the vast majority of criminal prosecutions, the government
has already offered sufficient evidence of intent from which the fact finder can find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
96. 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980).
97. See id. at 939.
98. See id. at 938–39.
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offered during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.99 This allows the judge to
determine if the 404(b) evidence has any probative value, for a purpose
other than to prove character, before admitting the evidence.100
In addition to laying out this new procedure, the Figueroa court also held
that an unequivocal offer to stipulate is unnecessary to remove an issue
from dispute to exclude 404(b) evidence.101 Here, the government sought
to admit evidence that the defendant, Ralph Acosta, was previously
convicted of selling narcotics to prove that he intended to deal heroin.102 At
no point during the trial, however, did Acosta’s counsel question whether
Acosta intended to sell heroin or if he instead intended to sell some other
non-narcotic substance.103 Counsel made clear that this was not his
defense; instead, he denied that the alleged conduct occurred at all.104 The
Second Circuit held that Acosta’s counsel raised no issue concerning
Acosta’s intent and so “had sufficiently removed that issue from the
case.”105
While the government argued that Acosta did not remove intent as a
disputed issue in the case,106 the court held that whether an issue remains
“sufficiently in dispute” does not depend on the words used, but depends
rather on the effect that the trial court gives to the words.107 Therefore,
while a stipulation suffices to remove an issue from dispute, it is not always
necessary.108 Instead, defense counsel may remove an issue from dispute if
counsel were to
express a decision not to dispute that issue with sufficient clarity that the
trial court will be justified (a) in sustaining objection to any subsequent
cross-examination or jury argument that seeks to raise the issue and (b) in
charging the jury that if they find all the other elements established
beyond a reasonable doubt, they can resolve the issue against the
defendant because it is not disputed.109

A formal stipulation is not required; rather, it is enough for the defense to
not contest the issue during trial.110
Similarly, in United States v. Estabrook,111 the Eighth Circuit affirmed
that its general rule was to “delay admission of 404(b) evidence until after
the defense rests.”112 The court reasoned that this was the best time to
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 942.
102. See id. at 939.
103. See id. at 940. If this had been his defense, then evidence may have been permitted
to prove knowledge or absence of mistake.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 941.
107. See id. at 942.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See id. The Figueroa court proceeded to discuss jury instructions, which this Note
considers in the next section.
111. 774 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 289.

294

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

determine whether the issue the 404(b) evidence seeks to prove was really
in dispute and to properly weigh its probative worth and prejudicial
effect.113
Predictably, other circuits disagreed with this approach. The Seventh
Circuit expressly rejected the Figueroa approach in United States v.
Mounts,114 relying on its precedent that entitles the government to introduce
404(b) evidence to prove intent even when the defendant has not disputed
intent.115 The Third Circuit concluded that its case law precluded it from
accepting the Second Circuit approach116 but left “the door open” for
district courts to exclude 404(b) evidence when a defendant makes it clear
that he is not contesting the issue.117
3. “Must Convict” Jury Instructions
Even when a court accepts a defense stipulation or agrees that the
element at issue is not disputed, the trial judge must give the jury some
explanation on how to deliberate.118 The jury instruction, which often goes
hand-in-hand with the first two defense methods for excluding 404(b)
evidence,119 emphasizes that the jury need not find proof of a certain
element, which further diminishes the probative value of any 404(b)
evidence.120
113. See id. (citing United States v. Wagoner, 713 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir. 1983), and
Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 939). The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach. See United States v.
Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that there was no issue of intent when the
defendant claimed mistaken identity and denied participating in the alleged crime and further
stating that “if the act be proven the intent will usually be inferred”). The First Circuit also
considered the Figueroa approach, but did not officially adopt it because it was apparent that
intent would be in dispute in the case in question. See United States v. Simon, 842 F.2d 552,
555 (1st Cir. 1988).
114. 35 F.3d 1208, 1215 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the
404(b) evidence was not relevant to any fact at issue at the time the evidence was offered as
“unavailing because unlike the Second Circuit . . . this Circuit permits the government to
present Rule 404(b) evidence in its case in chief if the crime requires proof of specific
intent”). The Seventh Circuit distinguishes between general intent crimes and specific intent
crimes. See infra notes 299–305 and accompanying text.
115. See United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing United
States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 102, 107 (7th Cir. 1978)).
116. See United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1274 (3d Cir. 1994).
117. See id.
118. See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED
ADMISSIBILITY § 1.11.5 n.58 (2002) (“When parties ‘stipulate’ to a fact, the trial
judge . . . tell[s] the jury that ‘[I]f . . . you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of
the crime charged, you must find him guilty.’”); see also CLIFFORD C. FISHMAN, 3 JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 17:99 (7th ed. 1998).
119. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
120. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d 1405, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 U.S.
1087 (1997), rev’d en banc 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that a stipulation
coupled with a “must convict” jury instruction should result in the same outcome as
admitting 404(b) evidence coupled with a limiting instruction; otherwise, “not only would
the jury have to disregard a clear, simple instruction, but it also would have to acquit on a
theory of the facts not advanced by either party and unsupported by any record evidence”);
see also Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 248–49 (providing as a possible jury instruction, “if
you the jury find that the defendant committed the charged act beyond a reasonable doubt,
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For instance, in Crowder I, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted the
Second Circuit’s view toward stipulations.121 There, the defendant, Horace
Lee Davis, was convicted of intent to distribute crack cocaine.122 His
defense theory was mistaken identity, arguing that he had nothing to do
with the sale.123 Prior to trial, the government notified the defense that it
intended to introduce three of Davis’s prior cocaine sales to prove
knowledge and intent.124 Subsequently, the defense offered to stipulate to
both of these elements, conceding “that the person who possessed the drugs
both knew that they were drugs and intended to sell them.”125 On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit held that the stipulation, coupled with a sufficient jury
instruction, was enough to prevent the government from introducing any
other evidence that the jury could use for impermissible propensity
purposes.126
In Figueroa, the Second Circuit considered the conditional type of
stipulation at issue in Crowder I: where the defendant claims no
involvement in the crime but concedes that if the jury finds that the
prosecution proves the identity as to the defendant, it must also find that the
defendant had the requisite knowledge and intent.127 The court reasoned
that the stipulation’s conditional nature can be confusing, but the risk can be
minimized by a simple “must convict” jury instruction.128
The Second Circuit similarly held in Mohel that once a concession is
made by the defendant, the trial judge can instruct the jury that if it finds
“beyond a reasonable doubt that all the other elements of the offense have
been established a verdict of guilty may be returned.”129
The First Circuit took a different approach in United States v. Garcia.130
Recognizing the increasing frequency of 404(b) admissibility appeals, the
court offered guidance on how to approach the issue.131 As it pertained to
defense offers to stipulate, the court held that if the judge determined the
proffered stipulation was sufficient, the judge should confirm that the
defendant was aware of the implications his stipulation would have on the
judge’s jury instruction before directing the jury to resolve the issue against
the defendant.132 With regard to an uncontested element, rather than a
you may infer from the act and all its surrounding circumstances that the defendant intended
the natural and probable consequences of that act beyond a reasonable doubt” (quoting
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514–15 (1979))).
121. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1410 (“[W]e think the . . . Second . . . Circuit[’s] treatment
of an offer to concede is most convincing.”).
122. See id. at 1408.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1410.
127. See generally United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980).
128. See id. at 942; cf. Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1415 (suggesting that a “must convict”
instruction is actually “clear” and “simple”).
129. United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 754 (2d Cir. 1979).
130. 983 F.2d 1160 (1st Cir. 1993).
131. See id. at 1175.
132. Id. at 1175–76.
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proffered stipulation, the court found this defense method inadequate to
allow the judge to instruct the jury that the element need not be
considered.133
When a court does not accept these methods and allows 404(b) evidence
at trial, the judge can—and, in many circuits, is required to—give a limiting
instruction to the jury.134 When a trial judge is deciding whether to admit
404(b) evidence, however, the judge is supposed to consider the effect that
the limiting instruction might have on the jury.135 A majority of lower
courts accept the notion that a limiting instruction effectively lessens the
potential for 404(b) evidence to have a prejudicial effect.136 This remains
the case even though the Court has recognized that limiting instructions
may not work, especially when the evidence is likely to invoke high
emotions in the jury.137
Other courts, however, did not require a limiting instruction to be issued
unless requested138 and also never entertained the idea that a “must convict”
jury instruction could further devalue the probative worth of 404(b)
evidence. In United States v. Hadley139—and again in Breitkreutz140—the
Ninth Circuit made clear that whether the defense elects not to contest an
issue or unequivocally offers to stipulate to an issue does not matter; the
prosecution may present its case the way it sees fit.141 Thus, coupling a
133. See id. at 1175 (“[D]efense counsel’s comments suggesting that the defendant would
not argue an issue . . . were quite different from saying that the judge may instruct the jury
that . . . the defense w[ould] not dispute the ‘knowledge’ or ‘intent’ needed to support the
conviction.”).
134. See LEONARD, supra note 32, § 4.7 (finding that the Court’s ruling in Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), suggests that the general framework for admissibility of
404(b) evidence should include a limiting instruction and, at the least, the Third, Fourth, and
Tenth Circuits include one in their respective rules).
135. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (“In reaching a decision whether to
exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.”); see also 22A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5222 (2d ed.
2014).
136. See LEONARD, supra note 118, § 1.11.5. But cf. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 135,
§ 5222; Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 254 (“[S]ocial science has unequivocally
demonstrated the utter futility of relying on limiting instructions to cure whatever error
might occur in the admission of similar acts evidence.”).
137. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 17, § 4:13 n.25; see also Sonenshein,
supra note 55, at 271 (explaining that the inefficiency of limiting instructions may derive
from jurors’ failure to understand the instruction or that they comprehend the instruction but
ignore it in favor of what they think is right); cf. Walton, supra note 35, at 1082 (“[E]ven
when passions are low, not everyone can follow jury instructions.” (quoting Andrew K.
Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 249 (1976))).
138. See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
while a limiting instruction would have been preferred, the judge’s failure to issue one was
reversible error because no instruction was requested by the defendant).
139. 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 503 U.S. 905 (1992), and dismissed as
improvidently granted, 506 U.S. 19 (1992).
140. 8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172
(1997); see supra Part I.B.1.
141. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 852 (“This burden is not relieved by a defendant’s promise to
forgo argument on an issue. . . . Hadley’s choice of defense did not relieve the government
of its burden of proof . . . .”).
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jury instruction with a proffered stipulation or uncontested issue did not
suffice to exclude permissible 404(b) evidence during the Rule 403
balancing test in the Ninth Circuit.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court recognized the different approaches of
the lower courts in admitting 404(b) evidence and granted certiorari in
Hadley.142 Eight months later, however, the Court dismissed the case as
improvidently granted without giving an explanation.143 With the dismissal
of certiorari in Hadley, the lower courts continued to be divided over when
to admit 404(b) evidence.
C. The Turning Point: Old Chief v. United States
In 1997, the Supreme Court revisited the subject, albeit in a much more
limited manner. Old Chief addressed the much narrower issue of how to
treat defense offers to stipulate to the prior conviction “status” element in
felon-in-possession cases.144 Prior to the decision, some circuits had ruled
that a defense stipulation to a qualifying prior conviction prohibited
evidence of the nature of the crime.145 Other circuits held that a prosecutor
need not accept a defense offer to stipulate to the prior conviction, thus
freeing the prosecutor to prove the nature of the defendant’s prior crime.146
In Old Chief, the Court held that a prosecutor in a felon-in-possession case
must accept a defense offer to stipulate to the status element.147
Old Chief was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana on, inter alia, felon in possession of a firearm charges.148 The
federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), makes it unlawful for a person
previously convicted of a felony to possess a firearm, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.149 At trial, Old Chief offered
to stipulate to this element, effectively relieving the prosecution of the need
142. Hadley v. United States, 503 U.S. 905 (1992).
143. Hadley v. United States, 506 U.S. 19 (1992).
144. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 172 (1997); see also Walton, supra
note 35, at 1068–69. The status element in felon-in-possession cases is important because
the act charged would not be a crime if the defendant was not a convicted felon, as opposed
to a case in which a prior felony conviction bears only on sentencing. See Risinger, supra
note 2, at 425.
145. See United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that
forcing the prosecution to accept a stipulation to the status element in a felon-in-possession
case in no way weakens the prosecution’s argument); United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97,
103 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that in a felon-in-possession case, the jury need only know that
there was a prior conviction, and the underlying facts of a prior conviction are irrelevant to a
jury); see also United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 323–24 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (adopting the
First Circuit’s holding in Tavares).
146. See United States v. Old Chief, No. 94–30277, 1995 WL 325745, at *1 (9th Cir.
May 31, 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding that “[r]egardless of the defendant’s
offer to stipulate, the government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense through
introduction of probative evidence”); see also United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15
(6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1975). Old Chief
abrogated both Burkhart and Smith.
147. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 178.
148. See id. at 172.
149. See id. at 174; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).

298

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

to prove this element by admitting evidence of Old Chief’s prior
convictions.150 The prosecutor refused to agree to the stipulation, asserting
that he could prove his case in the way he saw fit.151
On appeal, Old Chief argued that the district court abused its discretion
when the trial judge allowed prejudicial evidence concerning Old Chief’s
prior conviction.152 Old Chief was previously convicted of an assault
causing serious bodily injury, and because his current case involved an
altercation with a gun, allowing the use of Old Chief’s prior conviction
could prejudice the jury.153 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
ruling, holding that “[r]egardless of the defendant’s offer to stipulate, the
government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense through introduction
of probative evidence.”154 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed.155
1. Majority Holding: Relevancy and the Holistic Method
The decision in Old Chief addressed whether a district court judge abuses
her discretion by allowing the prosecution to reject a defendant’s offer to
stipulate to the status element of a felon-in-possession charge.156 The issue
is whether the danger that the jury will use the name and nature of the prior
conviction for propensity purposes can ever be outweighed by its probative
worth in these cases.157
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the majority held that when a trial court
does not accept a stipulation of this sort, it abuses its discretion.158 The
Court divided its opinion into two tests of admissibility: first, the evidence
must pass through Rule 401; and second, the evidence must pass the Rule
403 balancing test.159 When applying the Rule 403 balancing test, the court
must consider the effect of offered stipulations against the prosecution’s
need for narrative integrity and evidentiary richness.160
To begin, the Court noted that Old Chief’s offer to stipulate did not make
the prior conviction evidence irrelevant under Rule 401.161 Pointing to the
advisory committee note to Rule 401, the Court held that evidence is not
irrelevant just because it is not a disputed issue, but rather, if otherwise
relevant evidence is to be excluded, it must be excluded under Rule 403.162
150. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 175.
151. See id. at 177.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 174–75; see also supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
154. Id. at 177 (quoting United States v. Old Chief, No. 94-30277, 1995 WL 325745 (9th
Cir. May 31, 1995)).
155. See id. at 178.
156. Id. at 174.
157. See id. While the issue in this case pertains narrowly to the element of a prior
conviction, it has had a significant effect on stipulations to any element of a crime. See infra
Part II.
158. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174.
159. See id. at 178, 180.
160. See id. at 183; see also infra Part I.C.2.
161. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 179.
162. See id.
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In other words, a defense stipulation that could serve to remove an issue
from dispute does not make evidence any less relevant.163
Then, the Old Chief majority addressed the more complicated matter of
the Rule 403 balancing test.164 While noting that relevant evidence can be
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by “unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,”165 the Court focused on the
danger of unfair prejudice.166 The danger is clear: introducing evidence of
a defendant’s prior bad act can cause a jury to equate that prior act with the
defendant’s character.167 This might lure the jury into thinking the
defendant is more likely to have committed the current crime because he
committed the past one, or it might naturally prejudice the jury’s opinion,
convincing it that the defendant should be convicted regardless of his
guilt.168 It is precisely for this reason that Rule 404(a) exists.169
Recognizing that courts use different approaches to Rule 403 balancing,
the majority presented two possibilities: first, “[a]n item of evidence might
be viewed as an island,” with judges considering only that item’s probative
value against its prejudicial risk; or second, “the question of admissibility
might be seen as inviting further comparisons to take account of the full
evidentiary context of the case.”170
The Court readily adopted the second, more “holistic” approach in Old
Chief, explaining that if there was an objection to the admissibility of an
item of evidence, the trial judge should consider the probative value and
unfair prejudice in light of any available substitutes for that evidence.171 If
an available substitute has a lower danger of prejudice and the same
probative value, then a proper exercise of judicial discretion seems to
require a court to exclude 404(b) evidence under Rule 403.172 The Court
qualified this substantial instruction to trial judges by pointing out the need
to weigh the discounted value of the item of evidence against the need for
“evidentiary richness and narrative integrity.”173

163. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note.
164. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180.
165. FED. R. EVID. 403.
166. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 180–81.
169. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (stating the permissible and impermissible uses of character
evidence); see also Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181 (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 475–76 (1948)).
170. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182.
171. See id.; see also Kidd, supra note 46, at 257 (“Thus, a holistic approach to Rule 403
concerning prior convictions should bar evidence of the name and nature of the offense since
less prejudicial alternatives exist which reduce the probative value of the prior
convictions.”).
172. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182–83.
173. See id. at 183. But cf. Thompson, supra note 47, at 71 (arguing that the Court should
have ended its opinion at this point and that the subsequent paragraphs on narrative integrity
and evidentiary richness were mere dictum, which, in effect, undermined the true holding).
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a. Evidentiary Richness and Narrative Integrity
Responding to Justice O’Connor’s contention that there is a wellaccepted rule entitling the prosecution to prove its case in the manner in
which it chooses,174 Justice Souter questioned whether Old Chief’s
proffered stipulation carried the same evidentiary value as the evidence the
government wanted to introduce.175 Does the Court’s holding allow the
defendant to stipulate his way out of the case?176 What happens if the
404(b) evidence addresses a number of different elements, increasing the
force of that piece of evidence?177
The Court conceded in its opinion that a singular piece of evidence could
have great weight with a jury.178 The Court reasoned that a stipulation is
abstract and may not be able to tell a “colorful story with descriptive
richness” in the same manner as 404(b) evidence could.179 A stipulation, in
other words, may be less effective in implicating “the law’s moral
underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in judgment.”180 Lastly, the
Court addressed the ideas that a juror has expectations of what proper proof
should look like and that the prosecution must be allowed to satisfy these
demands,181 explaining that “[a] syllogism is not a story, and a naked
proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that
would be used to prove it.”182
b. The Narrow Holding
The majority found that the name and nature of Old Chief’s prior
conviction would be highly prejudicial and the district court should have
considered Old Chief’s offer to stipulate to his prior conviction when
174. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 198 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 186.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 187.
178. See id. (“When a juror’s duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of what a
defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no set of abstract statements ever
could . . . .”).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 187–88 (“[T]he prosecution may fairly seek to place its evidence before
the jurors . . . to convince [them] that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable . . . .”).
181. Id. at 188 (suggesting that a juror might penalize the prosecution for not producing
evidence that satisfies the jury’s expectations).
182. Id. at 189; cf. ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 2:3 (2d ed. 2001)
(reasoning that, if this principle is carried to its logical extreme, it would “revolutionize the
law of relevancy”). Park goes on to interpret the Court’s language as entitling the
prosecution to admit evidence that is not needed for the jury to make logical inferences, but
might be needed for the jury to establish “human significance” and adhere to its moral
reasoning. See id. § 2:3; see also James Joseph Duane, “Screw Your Courage to the StickingPlace”: The Roles of Evidence, Stipulations, and Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 463, 463–64 (1998) (citing Risinger, supra note 2, for the proposition that this
portion of the Old Chief opinion, “a curious four-paragraph dollop of dictum buried in the
middle of the majority opinion,” involved a marked departure from several points that the
Court had long regarded as settled). Duane surmises that this “four-paragraph disclaimer”
was the price the majority paid in order to pick up the crucial fifth vote from Justice
Kennedy. Id. at 464.
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deciding to admit the evidence.183 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court
held that Old Chief’s offer to stipulate to the element amounted to an offer
to admit to the prior conviction “and a defendant’s admission is, of course,
good evidence.”184 The Court stressed that because the name and nature of
the prior conviction was not pertinent to the current crime charged, allowing
evidence of the prior conviction would not have further explained a part of
the element that the stipulation would not otherwise cover.185 Logic,
Justice Souter explained, would thus require the trial court to accept the
stipulation when balancing under Rule 403.186
Old Chief made clear that the prosecution has no need for evidentiary
depth to tell a story with respect to Old Chief’s—or any defendant’s—legal
status.187 The prior conviction element of the crime that is alleged does not
treat different felonies differently, the prior conviction is not purportedly
used to prove any other elements, and excluding the name and nature of the
prior conviction does not leave any sort of gap in the prosecution’s story of
the defendant’s crime.188 The Court thus held that under the Rule 403
balancing test, the stipulation to the prior conviction and the evidence
describing the name and nature of the prior conviction are distinguishable
“only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other.”189
Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the
404(b) evidence.190
2. The Old Chief Dissent
In dissent, Justice O’Connor disagreed with both the holding of Old
Chief, that the government must accept a defense stipulation to a prior
conviction in a felon-in-possession case, and its reasoning, that revealing
the name and nature of the defendant’s prior conviction is unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant under Rule 403.191 In Justice O’Connor’s view,
while evidence of this nature may harm the defendant, it is not “unfair” and
thus not precluded by Rule 403.192

183. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186.
184. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)). But see United States v. Old Chief, No. 9430277, 1995 WL 325745, at *1 (9th Cir. May 31, 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (“Under
Ninth Circuit law, a stipulation is not proof, and, thus, it has no place in the [Rule] 403
balancing process.”). While the Supreme Court reversed the holding of this case, it did not
specifically reverse the Ninth Circuit’s rule that a stipulation is not sufficient proof in cases
other than status. See infra Part II.B.2, II.C.
185. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 190.
188. See id. at 190–91 (“[P]roof of the defendant’s status goes to an element entirely
outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to
commit the current offense.”).
189. Id. at 191.
190. See id.; see also Kidd, supra note 46, at 258 (“The court abuses its discretion if it
fails to exclude the full record when it is unnecessary, does not damage the prosecution’s
burden of proof on the status element, and will lead to improper jury considerations.”).
191. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 192–93 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 193; see also FED. R. EVID. 403.
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Justice O’Connor explained that the relevant statute envisioned the
necessity for jurors to learn the name and nature of the crime because the
accused must have previously committed a particular type of crime to
satisfy the prior conviction element.193 The dissent argued that any harm
that may result from introducing the name and nature of the prior
conviction could be mitigated by a limiting instruction.194
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority’s reasoning in concluding
that the defense stipulation has the same probative value as the
government’s evidence is inherently flawed.195 The dissent believed that a
jury would be just as confused by the “missing chapter” of the defendant’s
prior conviction as by a defense concession to any other element of the
crime.196 Perhaps more importantly, Justice O’Connor asserted that even
when a defendant attempts to stipulate or successfully stipulates to an
element of the crime, it does not remove the government’s burden to prove
each element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.197 Because the
government has this burden, “it must be accorded substantial leeway to
submit evidence of its choosing to prove its case.”198
II. OLD CHIEF’S AFTERMATH
Justice Souter’s majority opinion concerning narrative integrity and
evidentiary richness produced strong reactions and varied interpretations as
to how those portions of the opinion applied to elements of a crime other
than the status element. It is indisputable, however, that Old Chief
significantly clarified Rule 403, explicitly holding that the probative value
of evidence must be determined by comparing alternative evidence.199
While the advisory committee’s notes to Rule 403 suggest this, lower courts

193. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 194. The crime must have been punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and particular crimes, such as business crimes,
require a potential imprisonment of at least two years. See id. Justice O’Connor reasoned
that the Government was allowed to admit the specific gun that Old Chief possessed even
though any firearm would satisfy the requirement and that this is no different than admitting
the name and nature of the prior felony. See id. at 194–95.
194. See id. at 196. But see Walton, supra note 35, at 1082 (noting that Justice O’Connor
failed to recognize the shortcomings of limiting instructions and that her argument “implies
that they are a magical solution to a material problem . . . [that] fails to justify or to remedy
the likelihood of unfair prejudice that will result from admitting evidence on the nature of a
prior conviction”).
195. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 198 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. See id. at 199–200. Justice O’Connor’s view is clearly inconsistent with the
majority’s determination that a stipulation is the equivalent to an admission, which is, of
course, “good evidence.” See id. at 186.
198. See id. at 200. But see Risinger, supra note 2, at 451–53 (“Justice O’Connor’s
treatment of the defendant’s judicial admission as not formally binding seems disingenuous.
. . . Functionally, [refusing to permit a “must convict” jury instruction] is no more than
saying that the right to a jury trial on every formal issue belongs to the government as well as
the defense, and that the government may insist on it under all circumstances.”).
199. See Rule 403—Unfair Prejudice, 111 HARV. L. REV. 360, 365 (1997).
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did not always heed that instruction, sometimes failing even to conduct a
Rule 403 balancing test.200
The previous part discussed the background of Old Chief and analyzed
the Court’s opinion. Part II of this Note focuses on the effects of that
opinion and how the lower courts’ interpretations have changed in light of
the Supreme Court’s holding. Part II.A looks at the circuit courts that
changed their approaches to admitting 404(b) evidence in light of Old
Chief, some of which explicitly overruled precedent while others merely
tweaked their tests. Part II.B focuses on the circuits that did not alter their
404(b) admissibility tests, either because or in spite of Old Chief’s
discussion on narrative integrity and evidentiary richness. This section
looks at circuits on both sides of the 404(b) admissibility spectrum, with a
focus on their application of the Rule 403 balancing test. Finally, Part II.C
analyzes the current trends of the Ninth Circuit in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s reversal of its Old Chief decision.
A. Reversal Effect of Old Chief
As seen in Part I, many circuits prior to Old Chief held that 404(b)
evidence would not be allowed as proof of an element that was uncontested,
whether the element was undisputed or the defense offered to stipulate to
it.201 These circuits held that when an element was uncontested, a jury
instruction would be sufficient to relieve the prosecution of its burden of
proof on that element.202 Following Old Chief, however, some of these
circuits understood Old Chief’s discussion on narrative integrity and
evidentiary richness as overruling, either explicitly or implicitly, some of
their prior holdings and 404(b) jurisprudence.
1. Crowder II: The D.C. Circuit Is the First to Fall
The D.C. Circuit was the first court to determine how Old Chief affected
stipulations other than status. As discussed in Part I, the D.C. Circuit found
in Crowder I that a trial court abuses its discretion when it admits 404(b)
evidence to prove an element of a crime if the defendant has offered to
stipulate to that same element.203 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
Crowder I to review this holding but vacated and remanded the decision in
light of the Court’s concurrent holding in Old Chief.204
On remand, the D.C. Circuit considered the case again (Crowder II) and
reversed, holding that “despite a defendant’s unequivocal offer to stipulate
to an element of an offense, Rule 404(b) does not preclude the government

200. See id. (“The Court’s mandate that lower courts weigh the probative and prejudicial
values of evidentiary alternatives along with the evidence in question should add structure to
trial court decisionmaking and facilitate review of such decisions.”).
201. See supra Part I.B.
202. See supra Part I.B.3.
203. See United States v. Crowder (Crowder II), 141 F.3d 1202, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (summarizing Crowder I).
204. See United States v. Crowder, 519 U.S. 1087, 1087 (1997).
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from introducing evidence of other bad acts to prove that element.”205 The
court reversed because it found its theory in Crowder I invalid in light of
Old Chief.206 The Crowder I holding rested on the theory that the
government does not need to prove knowledge and intent if the defendant
concedes these elements and the concession is combined with an explicit
jury instruction.207 The Crowder I court reasoned that the defendant’s
proffered stipulation combined with the judge’s instruction to the jury
eliminated the relevancy of the 404(b) evidence with respect to the
knowledge and intent elements; without another “nonpropensity purpose, its
only function would be to prove what Rule 404(b) barred.”208
On remand from the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit found its reasoning
in Crowder I to be flawed because it rested on the notion that the 404(b)
evidence was no longer relevant.209 As the Court held in Old Chief that an
issue need not be in dispute to be relevant and that alternative methods of
proof do not bar evidence from being relevant, the D.C. Circuit considered
its Crowder I theory overruled.210 The court reasoned that if the 404(b)
evidence remains relevant and the government seeks to admit it for a
nonpropensity purpose, then Rule 404(b) guarantees the government the
right to seek its admission.211 If the trial court were then to exclude the
evidence, it would have to be on a finding that the evidence is unfairly
prejudicial in light of the proposed stipulation coupled with a jury
instruction.212 Under this analysis, and in light of Old Chief’s notions of
narrative integrity and evidentiary richness, the D.C. Circuit reversed its
prior holding.213
The Crowder II holding relied heavily on Old Chief’s discussion about
stipulations, concluding that the Court’s objective was to distinguish the
status element from other elements where a stipulation would not be
satisfactory to the jury.214 Quoting Old Chief’s language on the importance
of narratives,215 the D.C. Circuit was convinced that when it came to the
elements of intent and knowledge, the probative value of the evidence of
205. Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1203.
206. See id. at 1206. But see Thompson, supra note 47, at 73 (noting that Crowder II is
“in no uncertain terms, a holding that runs counter to Old Chief’s actual holding and what
FRE 404(b) requires”).
207. See Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1205.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 1206.
210. See id. The D.C. Circuit rested its holding in Crowder I on Rule 401, while the
Supreme Court rested its holding in Old Chief on Rule 403, and for this reason, the D.C.
Circuit re-evaluated its holding in light of the Court’s opinion. See id.
211. See id. But see id. at 1215 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial judge, then-Chief
Judge Penn, in Crowder I: “Let’s not kid ourselves, . . . the reason the government seeks to
introduce [404(b) evidence] is because it’s prejudicial.” (citations omitted)).
212. See id. at 1206–07 (as opposed to a finding that the stipulation and jury instruction
rendered the 404(b) evidence irrelevant).
213. See id. at 1207–09.
214. See id. at 1207.
215. See id. (arguing that “a syllogism is not a story” and the “evidentiary account of
what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no abstract statements ever
could” (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–89 (1997))).
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Davis’s prior cocaine sales was not outweighed by its potential prejudicial
effect.216 On the issue of whether Davis had the intent to distribute, the
court reasoned that the evidentiary strength of stipulating to intent by
concession (i.e., that whomever possessed the drugs in question possessed
them with the intent to distribute) was not as good as evidence that Davis
had previously possessed and sold cocaine.217
In sum, the court held that the evidentiary richness of the 404(b) evidence
added to the narrative integrity of the prosecution and tilted the Rule 403
balance in favor of admission.218 As to Rule 403, the court held that (1)
“each case will turn on the discretionary judgment of the trial court and its
assessment, not of relevance, but of the evidentiary value of the
government’s Rule 404(b) evidence,”219 and (2) the government also will
have the effects of a limiting instruction to the jury to balance the scale
further in its favor.220
2. The Crowder Effect
The Crowder II majority believed that the force of evidence can affect its
worth and that the way that proof is delivered to the jury affects its richness
and value.221 Narrative integrity is about giving the prosecution the tools—
here, the evidence—it needs to convince the jury of the defendant’s guilt.222
The jury, naturally, is interested in learning what happened.223 Some courts
and commentators believe that jurors might punish the government if there
seems to be a missing piece of evidence in the story, even if both parties

216. See id. at 1209–10.
217. See id. at 1208 (“Far from a choice between ‘propositions of slightly varying
abstraction,’ the choice in these cases was between concrete evidence of the defendants’
actions giving rise to natural and sensible inferences, and abstract stipulations about
hypothetical persons not on trial.”). But see id. at 1215 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“The
[majority] court worries that [because the stipulations did not reference the defendants by
name,] a confused jury may decline to convict, but Crowder’s and Davis’s willingness to
accept a ‘must convict’ jury instruction removes this danger. . . . The offered instruction
makes abundantly clear that possession, not knowledge or intent, remains the only issue in
dispute.”).
218. See id. at 1210.
219. Id.
220. See id. But see MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 3 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404:5
(7th ed. 2012) (“The availability of a limiting instruction . . . while theoretically a factor in
balancing, is of little practical significance since logic and experience indicate that the jury
will be both uninterested in and incapable of considering the evidence solely for the purpose
offered and not as evidence of the guilt of the defendant for the crime charged.” (citing
United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 155 (1st Cir. 2004))).
221. See Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1210.
222. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–88 (1997). The Court’s
discussion on the matter focused on appeasing the jury and providing them with a complete
narrative. See id.
223. See Richard O. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a Supreme
Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2002);
see also Kidd, supra note 46, at 231 (suggesting that a voter on election night wants to know
the story of the campaign trail more than the tally of the vote and analogizing that to the jury
wanting to know the narrative of a crime rather than hearing a stipulation).
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and the judge assure the juror that it is not needed.224 The Crowder II
majority thus understood Old Chief to give a green light to evidence that
can fill in these missing pieces.225
Crowder II had a profound effect on the Eighth Circuit, which, prior to
Old Chief, had adopted the Second Circuit’s rule that a defendant can avoid
the prosecution’s 404(b) evidence if his defense is one of mistaken
identity.226
In the wake of Old Chief and Crowder II, the Eighth Circuit effectively
held this line of cases overruled in United States v. Hill.227 Even conceding
that the 404(b) evidence in question—a prior drug conviction—in Hill was
“remote in time” from the acts charged,228 limiting its ability to assist the
prosecution’s narrative, the court held the 404(b) evidence admissible to
prove intent.229 The Hill court found the remote criminal acts of the
defendant admissible because they could still be “a critical part of the story
of [the] crime, and may be introduced to prove what the defendant was
thinking or doing at the time of the offense.”230 Some argue, however, that
prior bad acts, especially those remote in time, are by their nature separate

224. See Lempert, supra note 223, at 18 (“The jury is, not unreasonably, suspicious when
evidence is provided in strange or unfamiliar ways, as by stipulations.”). But see Duane,
supra note 182, at 465–66 (“The [Old Chief] Court cites no authority to support that
proposition, and common sense squarely repudiates it. No sane jury would ever draw an
adverse inference against a party when the jury was given a sensible and uncontradicted [sic]
explanation for the absence of proof on a point.” (footnotes omitted)). Duane proceeded to
explain that a jury accepts the prosecution’s “failure” to provide proof of an element when it
is established, and when they are instructed that the trial judge denied the prosecution the
opportunity to offer evidence on the point because the defense formally admitted to the court
that the element was satisfied. See id. at 467.
225. Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1208–09. Others argue that this allows the story to be told
“at great cost to the defendant.” See Thompson, supra note 47, at 72 (“The need for a story
should never outweigh the highly prejudicial nature of prior bad acts.”). Rather than
determining the admissibility of evidence based on its ability to prove a historical fact that is
disputed at trial, courts are determining admissibility based on “its capacity to influence
jurors’ hearts as well as their minds.” See Duane, supra note 182, at 467–68 (interpreting
Old Chief’s discussion about “moral reasonableness” as establishing a need for evidence that
has the power to emotionally appeal to a jury and convince it to “reach an honest verdict”
and suggesting that this was a “radical” idea “with virtually no supporting authority”).
226. See United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 710–11 (8th Cir. 2001). Note that
knowledge and intent are naturally undisputed in this type of defense, unlike a defense where
the defendant claims to have innocently or mistakenly committed the act, in which 404(b)
evidence would be appropriate. See id. (citing United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 657 (2d
Cir. 1989)); supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
227. 249 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 947,
952 (8th Cir. 2006).
228. Inter alia, possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See Hill, 249 F.3d at 709, 713.
229. See id. at 713 (“The evidence was relevant to show Hill’s intent, thus it passed Rule
404(b)’s relevancy test. Based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Old Chief, this
evidence also satisfied Rule 403’s balancing test.”).
230. Id. (quoting Crowder II, 141 F.3d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)); see also
United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court
denied the defendant’s motion offering to stipulate to knowledge and intent because it was
easier for the jury to understand the concepts of knowledge and intent in this case if they
focused on the facts prior to the search and recovery of the cocaine).
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from the offense being tried and should not be integral to the story.231 By
allowing the introduction of Hill’s previous drug conviction at trial, the
court enabled the jury to make the inference—whether subconsciously or
not—that Hill had the propensity to commit drug offenses.232
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its post-Old Chief interpretation of Rule
404(b) in United States v. Walker.233 Explaining that the line of cases
arising out of United States v. Jenkins234 had been narrowed—if not
overturned completely—by Old Chief’s affirmation that the government has
the right to prove its case in the manner it sees fit, the Eighth Circuit held
that even though the defendant did not “actively” dispute the elements of
motive or intent, the Government was still permitted to offer evidence to
prove these factors.235
While other circuits are not quite as clear as to where on the 404(b)
admissibility spectrum they fall post-Old Chief, other circuits have followed
the D.C. and Eighth Circuits in broadening admissibility. The Fifth Circuit,
for example, held in United States v. Jackson236 that even when the
defendant claims mistaken identity and does not dispute intent, intent will
automatically be at issue in a specific intent crime.237 Meanwhile, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed its prior holdings excluding 404(b) evidence, but, at the
same time, opened the door for inclusion of this evidence when the
underlying crime requires specific intent.238 These decisions demonstrate
231. Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1214 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Past crimes
“risk[] creating too many narrative connections between past and present,” and by allowing
the prosecution to create these narratives, the court is authorizing the jury to make character
inferences. Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 22 (2006). It is precisely for this reason that narratives should not
include 404(b) evidence of uncontested elements. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 216–17.
Introducing evidence of prior similar acts at trial could produce the greatest prejudice
“because it makes the propensity inference almost inescapable.” See id. at 217.
232. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 218. The principle that a past drug conviction can
be admitted to prove intent in the current drug prosecution is “fatally flawed; its application
almost always violates Rule 404(b). What chain of reasoning can link the prior drug
history . . . to the charged crime other than one that infers that the defendant has a drugrelated propensity . . . ? There is no propensity-free chain.” See id. (quoting Andrew J.
Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on Character Reasoning from
Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 191–92 (1998)).
233. 428 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2005).
234. 345 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2003).
235. See Walker, 428 F.3d at 1169–70 (quoting Hill, 249 F.3d at 712); see also id. at 1170
(“Hill’s attempt to remove intent as an issue in the case did not lift the Government’s burden
of proving Hill’s intent.” (quoting Hill, 249 F.3d at 712)).
236. 339 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2003).
237. See id. at 355. This holding is contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s view on the issue prior
to Old Chief, see supra note 113, and was subsequently extended to include general intent
crimes. See United States v. McCall, 553 F.3d 821, 828 (5th Cir. 2008).
238. Compare United States v. Bilderbeck, 163 F.3d 971, 977–78 (6th Cir. 1999)
(holding that when a crime requires specific intent, the prosecution may use 404(b) evidence
to prove it in light of Old Chief, despite a proffered stipulation by the defense), with Jenkins,
345 F.3d at 939 (holding that the district court’s limiting instruction did not cure the
prejudicial effect of letting in 404(b) evidence); see also infra notes 248–61 and
accompanying text. But see United States v. Carter, 779 F.3d 623, 627 (6th Cir. 2015)
(narrowing Bilderbeck and holding that “mere possession of a controlled substance is not
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that courts do not have a clear understanding on how to interpret Old Chief.
While some courts interpret Old Chief to overrule its jurisprudence, others,
like the Sixth Circuit, briefly equivocated before reaffirming their
precedents.239
B. Other Circuits Double Down on 404(b) Jurisprudence
While some circuits shifted course after Old Chief, others stuck to their
precedent. This section first examines how the Sixth Circuit used Old
Chief’s concepts of narrative integrity and evidentiary richness to continue
excluding 404(b) evidence.240 Next, this section discusses the Second
Circuit’s reaffirmation of its holdings in Figueroa, Mohel, and Colon,
which prohibit 404(b) evidence if alternative evidence is available.241
Finally, this section addresses how the Seventh Circuit interpreted Old
Chief to reinforce its 404(b) admissibility jurisprudence, which is contrary
to the Second Circuit’s stance on undisputed elements.242 Accordingly, this
section demonstrates that the divergent views among the courts in Rule
403/404(b) admissibility persist in the wake of Old Chief and, arguably,
have been distended due to inconsistent interpretations of Old Chief.
1. The Second and Sixth Circuits Stick to Their Guns
on 404(b) Evidence Admissibility
Prior to Old Chief, some circuits excluded 404(b) evidence because it
lacked probative value, reasoning that the government’s burden of proof
was met on an element if that element was uncontested and a “must
convict” jury instruction was read explaining this was the case.243 At the
same time, these courts often found that even if the evidence had some
probative value, it was outweighed by its potential for prejudice and no
limiting instruction would suffice to cure the prejudice.244 Following Old
Chief, some circuits reaffirmed that these reasons justified the exclusion of
404(b) evidence, even when considering evidentiary richness and narrative
integrity.245
Simply put, these circuits hold that a limiting instruction is not an
adequate safeguard to justify permitting evidence that is unnecessary to
satisfy the prosecution’s burden of proof if that evidence could have a
sufficiently similar to distribution to be probative of a specific intent to distribute controlled
substances, even though both are obviously controlled-substance offenses”).
239. See infra Part II.B.
240. See infra notes 257–63 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 264–78 and accompanying text.
242. See infra Part II.B.2.
243. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 942 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Crowder I,
87 F.3d 1405, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), rev’d en banc
141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998); supra Part I.B. (discussing these cases within the broader
Rule 404(b) context).
244. See Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 946 (“[L]imiting instructions cannot be regarded as a
guaranty against prejudice.”).
245. The rest of this section discusses these cases and how the circuits’ interpretations
differ from those discussed in Part II.A.

2015]

APPLYING OLD CHIEF TO RULE 403

309

substantial prejudicial effect.246 This is so because, compared to “must
convict” instructions, the effect of limiting instructions is much more
uncertain.247
For example, in United States v. Jenkins,248 the Sixth Circuit found that
the district court’s limiting instruction was not a “sufficient remedy” for
letting in 404(b) evidence.249 There, the defendant, Candy Jenkins, was
charged with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine after law
enforcement officers found an unopened express mail package in her
residence that contained a large amount of the drug.250 Her defense at trial
was that she did not know that the package contained crack cocaine.251
The district court allowed the government to introduce 404(b) evidence
that Jenkins had previously smoked and was a current user of crack cocaine
in order to prove that she knew what was in the package.252 The court gave
a limiting instruction informing the jury that the evidence was only
admissible “to the extent that [they] may determine [the testimony] might
be relevant to the issue of knowledge.”253
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court abused its
discretion in admitting this evidence.254 The circuit court held that the
substantial prejudice caused by the admitted 404(b) evidence was not
sufficiently limited by the jury instruction.255 “A limiting instruction will
minimize to some degree the prejudicial nature of evidence of other
criminal acts; it is not, however, a sure-fire panacea for the prejudice
resulting from the needless admission of such evidence.”256
In deciding Jenkins, the Sixth Circuit considered the narrative integrity
and evidentiary richness concepts discussed in Old Chief.257 As mentioned
above, the district court let in the 404(b) evidence to help the prosecution
prove that Jenkins knew what was in the packages delivered to her
apartment.258 On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit held that her prior drug
use did not help prove her knowledge of what was in the package.259
Jenkins’s personal drug use, the court reasoned, did not add to the
prosecution’s story that she was involved in the distribution of crack
246. See infra notes 248–56 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. As Judge Tatel explained in his
Crowder II dissent, a limiting instruction requires the jury “to ignore the obvious implication
of bad acts evidence, [while] a ‘must convict’ instruction would not require the jury to
perform ‘mental gymnastics.’” See Crowder II, 141 F.3d 1202, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel,
J., dissenting) (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
248. 345 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2003).
249. See id. at 939.
250. Id. at 930–32.
251. See id. at 938.
252. See id. at 933.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 939.
255. See id.
256. Id. (quoting United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 724 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted)).
257. See id. at 937–39.
258. See id. at 933.
259. See id. at 937.
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cocaine;260 rather, if it added anything at all to the prosecution’s narrative, it
was probative of her character.261 Finding that there was no permissible
404(b) purpose for the admission of the evidence, the court additionally
ruled that the 404(b) evidence also did not meet the requirements of Rule
403.262 The court found that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed the probative value of the evidence and that the limiting
instruction was insufficient to remedy this danger.263
The Second Circuit similarly found that Old Chief did not overrule its
Rule 404(b) jurisprudence. Numerous Second Circuit decisions still cite
Mohel and Figueroa as good law,264 and the recent United States v.
Basciano265 decision demonstrates how the court factors Old Chief into its
404(b) admissibility decisions without overturning prior cases.266 In
Basciano, the Government sought to introduce multiple pieces of 404(b)
evidence—all involving Basciano’s alleged involvement in other violent
crimes—in order to prove Basciano’s motive for the charged crimes.267
Basciano’s counsel offered to stipulate to the existence of the Bonanno
crime family, its involvement in racketeering activity, and Basciano’s own
rank and position within the family at the time of his arrest.268 In light of
these concessions, the district court first determined the admissibility of the
404(b) evidence under Rule 404.269 Having found this requirement
satisfied, the court then turned to Rule 403, in line with both its own
jurisprudence and the method endorsed by the Old Chief majority.270
Quoting Old Chief throughout its analysis, the court evaluated the
probative value of the 404(b) evidence, factoring in any available
substitutes, including the stipulations by the defense.271 The court found it
within its discretion to exclude the government’s 404(b) evidence if using a
stipulation lowered the risk for prejudice and had the same probative value,
as “what counts as the Rule 403 ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence, as

260. See id. at 938.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 938–39. Having already answered the Rule 404(b) question, the court had
no need to answer the Rule 403 question. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to conduct the
analysis under Rule 403, perhaps in an attempt to clarify the court’s jurisprudence in the
wake of Old Chief. See id.
263. See id. at 939.
264. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2012); see also United
States v. Massino, 546 F.3d 123, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d
183, 193 (2d Cir. 2004).
265. No. 05-CR-060 (NGG), 2011 WL 114867 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2011), rev’d on
reconsideration, 2011 WL 477281 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011).
266. The Basciano case has a convoluted procedural history. For more factual detail and
reasoning, see United States v. Basciano, No. 03-CR-929 (NGG), 2006 WL 385325
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2006).
267. Basciano, 2011 WL 114867, at *2.
268. See id. at *5.
269. See id. at *2–3.
270. See id. at *3–4 (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997); United
States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980)).
271. See id. at *4 (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182).
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distinct from its Rule 401 ‘relevance,’ may be calculated by comparing
evidentiary alternatives.”272
The court then noted that Old Chief requires weighing the evidentiary
alternatives against the government’s “need” for evidentiary richness and
narrative integrity.273 The court also noted that even if two pieces of
evidence prove the same point, that does not mean that only one of them is
permissible.274 Furthermore, the court observed that a defendant cannot use
stipulations in order to deprive the government of evidentiary richness.275
Accordingly, the court considered the defendant’s concessions to be
“unequivocal” and took them into careful consideration when balancing the
probative value of the government’s proposed 404(b) evidence against its
potential prejudicial effect.276 The court subsequently held that some of the
government’s 404(b) evidence would be admissible where the court
believed its worth outweighed its prejudice, while other evidence was
inadmissible where alternative evidence was more prejudicial but similarly
probative even in light of the prosecution’s need for evidentiary richness.277
Basciano demonstrates that after Old Chief, the Second Circuit still
adheres to the approach set forth in Figueroa. The court has held that if an
element is undisputed, then 404(b) evidence is not allowed, despite Old
Chief’s discussion on narrative integrity and evidentiary richness.278
2. A Narrow Reading of Old Chief Reinforces
404(b) Evidence Admissibility
The Seventh Circuit still strongly believes that due to the burden of
proof, prosecutors should be allowed to admit 404(b) evidence as long as it
is used for a permissible purpose—even if it addresses an element not in
dispute. The court, which held prior to Old Chief that the prosecution is
always entitled to prove its case in the way it sees fit,279 determined that
Old Chief confirmed its approach.280 In spite of Old Chief’s holding that a
stipulation must be accepted as proof of status, the Seventh Circuit used the
majority’s discussion of narrative integrity and evidentiary richness to
reaffirm that the prosecution “is entitled to prove its case free from any
defendant’s option to stipulate the evidence away” in situations involving
elements other than status.281

272. Id. (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182–84).
273. See id. (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183).
274. See id. One could argue that that is exactly what Rule 403 prohibits. See FED. R.
EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
275. Basciano, 2011 WL 114867, at *4.
276. See id. at *5.
277. See id.
278. See id.; see also supra note 264 and Part I.B.1–2.
279. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (given that proper limiting
instructions would be read to the jury to combat any prejudicial effect of 404(b) evidence).
280. See United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2001).
281. See id. at 875 (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997)).
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In so concluding, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Old Chief’s holding
narrowly.282 The court had held in United States v. Connor283 that neither
stipulations nor the lack of dispute on an issue could relieve the prosecution
from its burden in circumstances other than those present in Old Chief. “To
hold otherwise would be to tie the hands of the government in meeting its
burden of proof where no defense was presented on an element . . . .”284
Connor relied on United States v. Williams,285 an earlier opinion holding
that a defendant’s ability to stipulate would “render prosecutors unable to
meet the jury’s expectations of proof” because it would break the “natural
sequence of narrative evidence.”286 Here, the court followed the D.C.
Circuit’s lead in Crowder II. Reginald Williams was charged with
possession with intent to distribute cocaine.287 The court allowed the
testimony of John Peeler, in which he said that he had often purchased
drugs from Williams in the past, in order to demonstrate “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and absence of mistake or
accident.”288 As in Crowder II, the defendant offered to stipulate to the
elements of intent and knowledge by conceding that whoever possessed the
drugs in question had the necessary intent, leaving physical possession of
the drugs as the only issue.289
Relying on Crowder II and Old Chief, the Seventh Circuit held that this
type of stipulation is abstract and “simply does not contain the same or
similar evidentiary force as a showing that Mr. Williams himself had such
intent and knowledge.”290 The court held this completely distinguishable

282. See United States v. Bowling, 770 F.3d 1168, 1176 (7th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing
the facts in this case “from those in Old Chief, which the Supreme Court deliberately limited
to cases involving proof of felon status” (citing United States v. Phillippi, 442 F.3d 1061,
1064 (7th Cir. 2006))). But see Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 249 (pointing out that nowhere
in Old Chief did the Supreme Court hold that courts could not balance the need for 404(b)
evidence against its potential prejudice in situations other than felon status).
283. 583 F.3d 1011, 1022–23 (7th Cir. 2009). The court does not mention Old Chief in
its Rule 404(b) reasoning because the court considers Old Chief to be limited to its facts. See
supra note 282.
284. Connor, 583 F.3d at 1023. Is this holding justified if the introduction of evidence is
just a means to an end? See Walton, supra note 35, at 1087. “The only legitimate purpose
for introducing evidence is to prove the ultimate . . . propositions disputed between the
parties.” See id. (citations omitted). As Old Chief held, a defendant’s unequivocal
stipulation “is, of course, good evidence.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186
(1997); see also Crowder I, 87 F.3d 1405, 1422–23 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519
U.S. 1087 (1997), rev’d en banc 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“While a defendant’s
concession or offer to stipulate is not ‘proof,’ it may serve the same function, and the trial
judge should factor it into the 403 balance.”).
285. 238 F.3d 871, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188–89 (1997)).
286. See id. at 876 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188–89). In Williams, the defense was
that the drugs did not belong to the defendant—essentially arguing a case of mistaken
identity. See id. at 873–74. In Connor, however, the defense counsel indicated that the
defendant was at the scene, but was merely an innocent bystander. See Connor, 583 F.3d at
1022.
287. See Williams, 238 F.3d at 873.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 876.
290. Id.
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from the status issue in Old Chief.291 Here, the court did not find the
richness of the stipulation to be the same as that of the evidence itself and,
thus, even a “must convict” jury instruction would not have the same effect
on the jury as would the 404(b) evidence the prosecution sought to
admit.292
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling also emphasized that the trial judge gave a
limiting instruction to the jury.293 Before Peeler’s testimony, the district
court told the jury that they should consider only the testimony “on the
question of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity and absence of mistake or accident.”294 The Seventh Circuit agreed
that the district court properly admitted the evidence and held that the
limiting instruction properly cautioned the jury to consider the testimony
for only those purposes—“a procedural safeguard that [the court has] often
found to minimize the prejudicial effect of [404(b)] evidence.”295
More recently, in United States v. Gomez,296 the Seventh Circuit found a
limiting instruction sufficient to counteract the admission of 404(b)
evidence.297 The court went to great lengths to establish what a good jury
instruction would look like.298 The court also made several findings
necessary to its main point. First, the court explained its prior decisions
concerning specific intent crimes versus general intent crimes and held that
in crimes of specific intent,299 the element of intent is automatically at
issue.300 Meanwhile, in crimes of general intent, the defendant’s intent can
be inferred from the act itself, and the defendant must put the element at
issue before 404(b) evidence can be admitted to prove the element.301
Second, the court held that even in specific intent crimes, “automatically at
issue” does not mean “automatically admissible.”302 Finally, the court
clarified its opinion from another recent case303 that there is no general rule
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 874.
295. Id. at 876.
296. 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014).
297. Id. at 860–61.
298. See id. The court found that a sufficient limiting instruction should explain to the
jurors that they must not use the 404(b) evidence to make character inferences and find that
the defendant has acted “in character” by allegedly committing the crime charged. See id.
This is so because “it does not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he committed” the
present act. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that this type of inference is not permitted
because the prosecution has the burden of proof and “it cannot discharge its burden by
inviting an inference that the defendant is a person whose past acts suggest a willingness or
propensity to commit crimes.” Id.
299. Possession with intent to distribute, for example, is a specific intent crime. See id. at
858.
300. See id.
301. See id.; see also supra note 257 (noting that the Sixth Circuit also makes this
distinction with specific intent crimes and more readily permits 404(b) evidence in these
cases).
302. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 859 (holding that 404(b) evidence must still be relevant and
more probative than prejudicial to be admissible).
303. See United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 759 (7th Cir. 2013).
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that excludes 404(b) evidence if the defendant does not “‘meaningfully
dispute’ the non-propensity issue for which the evidence is offered.”304 The
court qualified this holding by noting that the district court should consider
the degree to which the issue is actually contested in making its Rule 403
ruling.305 In other words, the Seventh Circuit distinguishes between
specific intent and general intent crimes in order to establish different
methods for when to permit 404(b) evidence.306
The court went a step further in United States v. Reed.307 There, the
court excluded 404(b) evidence that it found to be used solely for
propensity purposes.308 The court held that “[p]attern evidence is
propensity evidence,” and it may not be admissible unless the pattern
proves or suggests a fact at issue.309
In summary, the Seventh Circuit still permits 404(b) evidence in many
cases where its sister circuits do not,310 but it has recently started to
question whether evidence that is purported to be used for a proper purpose
is actually being used for the sake of demonstrating propensity.311
Additionally, Gomez established that the court abides by the maxim that the
prosecution is entitled to prove its case as it sees fit and an issue need not be
disputed in order for the government to offer 404(b) evidence to prove it.312
The Fourth Circuit is similar to the Seventh Circuit in several respects.
First, it also interpreted Old Chief narrowly.313 Second, the court made the
same distinction with specific intent crimes.314
In United States v. Queen,315 the Fourth Circuit laid out its test for
determining 404(b) admissibility.316 In addition to requiring that evidence
304. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 859.
305. See id. at 860.
306. See id. This Note deals mostly with cases involving specific intent crimes, which the
courts have found to be the most permissive when it comes to allowing 404(b) evidence. See
supra Parts I.B, II. See generally Sonenshein, supra note 55 (dissecting Old Chief as it
applies to intent crimes).
307. 744 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2013).
308. See id. at 525.
309. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 2012)).
310. Compare United States v. Connor, 583 F.3d 1011, 1026 (7th Cir. 2009) (admitting
404(b) evidence in spite of a defense offer to stipulate), with United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d
72, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that an offer to stipulate is alternative evidence that affects
the probative worth of potential 404(b) evidence).
311. See supra note 309 and accompanying text; see also Connor, 583 F.3d at 1025–26
(holding that a stipulation to an element cannot relieve the prosecution of its burden and does
not factor the availability of alternative evidence into its Rule 403 balancing test).
312. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2014). The court did
however point out that as 404(b) evidence is almost always prejudicial, the trial judge must
be sensitive to the real factual disputes in the case when conducting the Rule 403 balancing
test. See id. at 860.
313. See United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 833 n.14 (4th Cir. 1998) (“We
believe that the Supreme Court intended its decision in Old Chief to be limited to stipulations
involving a defendant’s status as a convicted felon. Otherwise, the Court, without
explanation, reversed a longstanding series of cases.”).
314. See United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035, 1040 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
unlike the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has no precept that 404(b) evidence is
inadmissible when the defendant unequivocally denies committing the crime and uses the
defense of mistaken identity).

2015]

APPLYING OLD CHIEF TO RULE 403

315

be relevant, necessary, and reliable to find a permissible 404(b) purpose, the
court emphasized that the evidence must also pass the Rule 403 balancing
test.317 The court further held that if a limiting instruction is requested, the
judge must issue one to safeguard “against the pitfalls the rule protects
against.”318 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if admissibility of 404(b)
evidence were determined according to these rules, then it would not be
used to convict a defendant for his prior acts or on the basis of his
character.319
The Fourth Circuit distinguished itself from the Seventh Circuit,
however, in United States v. McBride,320 when it overturned a trial court
and excluded the 404(b) evidence in question.321 In response to the
government’s argument that the 404(b) evidence was necessary for the
government to satisfy its burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit held that
“[w]hile this statement of the law is accurate, it does not provide a general
license for the use of essentially unrelated prior ‘bad act’ evidence.”322
The Seventh Circuit interprets Old Chief narrowly by its facts, but, at the
same time, uses Old Chief’s discussion of narrative integrity and
evidentiary richness.323 This allows the court to leverage Old Chief’s
discussion on narrative integrity and evidentiary richness, but distinguish
any case that does not involve felon-in-possession crimes from the holding
that a stipulation must be accepted as alternative evidence to prove an
element.324 The Fourth Circuit, however, interprets Old Chief narrowly, but
does not use the narrative integrity and evidentiary richness discussion to
allow in evidence that it otherwise would prohibit.325 What is still unclear
is if Old Chief requires alternative evidence to be factored into a court’s
Rule 403 balancing test in situations outside the facts of Old Chief. The
answer for the Seventh Circuit at least appears to be “no.”326
C. Where Does the Ninth Circuit Stand?
Before concluding this part of the Note, it is important to analyze how
the Ninth Circuit has treated 404(b) admissibility after its decision was
overturned in Old Chief. Conducting this analysis, however, is difficult due
to the lack of relevant cases. In one of the few post-Old Chief cases
315. 132 F.3d 991 (4th Cir. 1997).
316. Id. at 997.
317. See id. (“[T]he evidence’s probative value must not be substantially outweighed by
confusion or unfair prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate reason to emotion in the
factfinding process.”).
318. Id.
319. See id.
320. 676 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the evidence did not pass the Queen
admissibility test).
321. Id. at 398.
322. Id.
323. See supra notes 285–95 and accompanying text. See generally United States v.
Williams, 238 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2001).
324. See supra Part II.B.2.
325. See McBride, 676 F.3d at 398.
326. See supra notes 310–11 and accompanying text.
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discussing 404(b) evidence admissibility within the Rule 403 context,
United States v. Merino-Balderrama,327 the Ninth Circuit seemed to accept
Old Chief’s holding that a stipulation must be considered alternative
evidence and must be factored into the Rule 403 balancing test.328
In Merino-Balderrama, the court conceded that the defendant’s offer to
stipulate to two of three elements of the crime “added to the pool of
available evidentiary alternatives.”329 Furthermore, in stark contrast to its
Breitkreutz330 holding prior to Old Chief, here the court held that MerinoBalderrama’s proffered stipulation “would have been conclusive on those
two elements” and could have required the district court to exclude the
404(b) evidence the government wanted to use to prove those elements.331
This decision demonstrates that in light of the Old Chief opinion, the
Ninth Circuit, while still inclusive of 404(b) evidence in some respects, no
longer relies on its Breitkreutz reasoning that a stipulation is not proof and
should not be considered alternative evidence.332
It turns out that while the Supreme Court may have resolved the narrow
issue of defense stipulations to status elements of crimes in Old Chief, it
opened the door to widening the disparity in all other 404(b) admissibility
cases. Lower courts continue to struggle with two key unanswered
questions: First, how should the availability of alternative evidence or lack
of dispute on an issue affect the Rule 403 balancing process in deciding the
admissibility of 404(b) evidence? Second, how should the availability of
“must convict” and limiting instructions affect this analysis?
III. REENVISIONING THE RULES FOR ADMISSION OF 404(B) EVIDENCE
AND RULE 403 BALANCING
This Note has demonstrated that Rule 403 jurisprudence concerning
404(b) admissibility is inconsistent among the circuits. There is not a
definitive “circuit split,” but more of a spectrum: at one end, 404(b)
evidence is admitted, and at the other, it is excluded. Part III of this Note
provides a guide for courts to use in deciding whether to admit 404(b)
evidence and when to accept a proffered stipulation from the defense.
Part III.A of this Note proposes a comprehensive understanding of Old
Chief and its effects and applicability to 404(b) evidence admissibility.
This part examines both the holdings in the cases discussed above and
scholarly opinions to explain which interpretations are most true to Old
Chief’s teachings. Next, Part III.B suggests a unifying approach to 404(b)
327. 146 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1998).
328. See id. at 762.
329. Id.
330. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
331. Marino-Balderrama, 146 F.3d at 762 (holding that a proffered stipulation is “not
merely relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence of the element” (quoting Old Chief v.
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997))).
332. This differs from the Seventh Circuit, which reaffirmed after Old Chief that a
stipulation is too abstract in most circumstances and does not provide the evidentiary
richness to which the government is entitled. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying
text.
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admissibility. In doing so, this part focuses on when the prosecution and
court should accept a defense stipulation to an element. Finally, this part
addresses how limiting instructions should factor into a trial judge’s
decision.
A. How Courts Should Interpret and Apply Old Chief
While Old Chief has certainly been an important decision in 404(b)
admissibility jurisprudence, it has left too much room for interpretation. In
response, courts and commentators have interpreted it in the way they see
fit. Perhaps the Old Chief ruling could have been more clearly articulated.
The more likely case, however, is that courts have chosen to interpret Old
Chief through the lens required to achieve the results they desire.333
The main holding of Old Chief is not disputed: the government must
accept a defense offer to stipulate to the status element of a felon-inpossession charge.334 When one combines alternative evidence in the form
of a stipulation that the government can use to prove the status element with
the finding that the 404(b) evidence (i.e., the name and nature of Old
Chief’s prior conviction) does not add to the prosecution’s need for
evidentiary richness to tell a compelling narrative, it reduces the probative
value of the 404(b) evidence to the point that it is outweighed by its unfairly
prejudicial effect.335 Both of these conditions are essential to Old Chief and
support the proposition that the discussion on narrative integrity and
evidentiary richness is not “mere dicta.”336 The Court noted that the
general nature of Old Chief’s prior conviction is so outside the natural
narrative of what the prosecution needs to tell the jury that the stipulation
should suffice just as well.337
Beyond this narrow holding, Old Chief left the door open for
interpretations that run counter to the Court’s jurisprudence. First, while
the “four-paragraph dollop”338 on evidentiary richness and narrative
333. See Thompson, supra note 47, at 72–76.
334. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191.
335. See id. at 190. But some commentators feel that the narrative integrity and
evidentiary richness discussion was unnecessary to the majority’s holding. See supra note
173.
336. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191 (holding that the presumption that the prosecution
may choose its evidence is not applicable here because “proof of the defendant’s status goes
to an element entirely outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with
thinking and doing to commit the current offense”); see also supra notes 257–63 and
accompanying text (showing how the Sixth Circuit excluded 404(b) evidence because it did
not add to the narrative integrity of the prosecution’s case). But see supra notes 285–92 and
accompanying text (showing how the Seventh Circuit permits 404(b) evidence because
exclusion—and acceptance of a stipulation—would break the natural sequence of the
narrative).
337. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190 (“Nor can it be argued that the events behind the
prior conviction are proper nourishment for the jurors’ sense of obligation to vindicate the
public interest. . . . Congress, however, has made it plain that . . . the qualifying conviction
is alone what matters under the statute. ‘A defendant falls within the category simply by
virtue of past conviction for any [qualifying] crime . . . .’” (alteration in original) (citing
United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994))).
338. See Duane, supra note 182, at 463.
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integrity is indispensable to the Court’s holding, it seems to go astray when
Justice Souter reasons that 404(b) evidence may be necessary to “implicate
the law’s moral underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in
judgment.”339 This suggests that 404(b) evidence is allowed, and, in fact,
its admissibility is determined by its ability to help persuade the jury to use
its moral, not logical, judgment in deciding the outcome of the case.340
Surely, the majority did not intend for Old Chief to radically alter one of the
fundamental principles of the U.S. judicial system—that the jury must
judge a man based on the factual evidence of the particular crime at issue
and not on moral evidence of his character.341 In fact, interpreting Old
Chief in that way contradicts the rest of the opinion itself.342
Understanding that Old Chief could not have intended this consequence,
it is possible to see how the remainder of the discussion on narrative
integrity and evidentiary richness reinforces the majority’s holding. Even
once the Court factored in the prosecution’s “need” for narrative integrity
and evidentiary richness, the 404(b) evidence in Old Chief’s case still did
not carry enough probative worth to counteract the availability of
alternative proof.343
Second, the Court expressed a rule specific to the status element, which
essentially nullifies the need to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test in these
situations.344 In cases dealing with elements other than status, the Court
predicted that the prosecutor’s choice to introduce 404(b) evidence would
generally survive a Rule 403 analysis even when a defendant seeks to
stipulate to the element the evidence is meant to prove.345 But, the Court
also held that stipulations must be factored into the Rule 403 analysis, and,
more importantly, the Court did not limit this holding to status-only
cases.346 Accordingly, any court that dismisses the fact that an issue is not
disputed or that the defense has offered to stipulate to it without factoring it

339. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188; see also Duane, supra note 182, at 474.
340. See Duane, supra note 182, at 467.
341. See id. at 468 (“Incredibly, this breathtakingly radical vision of the trial process was
asserted with virtually no supporting authority.”); see also supra notes 19, 182 and
accompanying text.
342. See Brooks, supra note 231, at 22 (“The story of the past crime must be excluded,
not because it is irrelevant, but because it may appear over-relevant: ‘it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.’” (quoting Old Chief,
519 U.S. at 181)).
343. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183, 191. Likewise, the Second Circuit understood that
this holding could apply beyond the status element. See supra notes 266–77 and
accompanying text (analyzing the court’s holding in Basciano, No. 05-CR-060 (NGG), 2011
WL 114867, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2011), rev’d on reconsideration, 2011 WL 477281, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011)).
344. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191–92.
345. See id. at 192.
346. See id. at 184–85 (holding that the Rule 404 advisory committee’s notes “leave no
question” that a Rule 403 analysis requires not only weighing the evidence’s probative value
with its unfair prejudice, “but by placing the result of that assessment alongside similar
assessments of evidentiary alternatives”); see also FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s
note.
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into its Rule 403 balancing test is in error.347 Even if a court limits Old
Chief to the facts of the case, the advisory committee’s note to Rule 404
requires it.348
Third, Old Chief should not be interpreted to broaden the scope of 404(b)
admissibility. For instance, the D.C. and Eighth Circuits interpreted Old
Chief to overturn their line of cases on 404(b) admissibility under Rule
403.349 In Hill, the Eighth Circuit cited the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in
Crowder II to hold 404(b) evidence admissible even though the defense
offered to stipulate intent, and the evidence was completely remote in time
from the current charge.350 The court held that Old Chief “eliminates the
possibility that a defendant can escape the introduction of past crimes under
Rule 404(b) by stipulating to the element of the crime at issue.”351
Nowhere in Old Chief does it say this; rather, the Eighth Circuit simply
quotes a handful of lines from Old Chief’s evidentiary richness discussion
and uses them, without applying them to the facts of the case, to conclude
that the 404(b) evidence was properly allowed.352
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that because Old Chief held that evidence
does not lose its relevance under Rule 401 when the defense offers to
stipulate to the fact at issue, “it follows that Rule 404(b) evidence does not
lose its relevance toward a permissible inference simply because the
defendant offers to stipulate to that inference.”353 This conclusion,
however, does not follow for multiple reasons: first, the inference that the
jurors must make for the evidence to have any probative worth is not a
permissible one because past actions cannot prove intent for the current
action;354 and second, while it is true that the evidence may not lose its
relevance, it certainly loses some of its probative worth, which the court
must still weigh against its risk of unfair prejudice.355 Admitting 404(b)
evidence makes propensity inferences almost inescapable and should be
excluded when uncontested because its probative worth is outweighed by
its prejudicial effect.356 Regardless, a court abuses its discretion if it does
not conduct a thorough Rule 403 balancing test, analyzing in what realistic

347. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191. Therefore, Old Chief should mandate that the
Seventh Circuit does factor available alternative evidence into its Rule 403 balancing test.
For a discussion of the holding in United States v. Connor, 583 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2009),
see supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
348. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note; see also supra notes 34–37 and
accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
350. See United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 2001).
351. See id. at 712. But this is directly contrary to what Old Chief actually holds. See
supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text; see also Kidd, supra note 46, at 257–58.
352. See Hill, 249 F.3d at 712–13.
353. See id. at 712 (citing Crowder II, 141 F.3d 1202, 2016 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
354. Past crimes create too many narrative connections between past and present,
permitting the jury to make character inferences. See Brooks, supra note 231, at 22.
355. See supra notes 271–77 and accompanying text (demonstrating how courts within
the Second Circuit correctly conduct a Rule 403 balancing test).
356. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 216–17.
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way the prosecution benefits from permitting the 404(b) evidence against
the very real prejudice that may result.357
Finally, it has been arguably problematic that the Court drew such a rigid
distinction between the status element and all others.358 How would
allowing evidence on the nature of Old Chief’s prior conviction to prove the
status element of a felon-in-possession charge be any different than
allowing Hill’s prior drug conviction to prove intent to distribute cocaine?
In both cases, the defense offered to stipulate to the element that the
evidence was intended to prove, and in both cases, the evidence was remote
in time and should not have been a part of the prosecution’s narrative of the
charged crime.359 In reality, both pieces of 404(b) evidence would be used
to add richness to the government’s story about the man on trial, not about
the act he is on trial for, which is, without question, impermissible.360
There is no propensity-free chain that allows a juror to prove intent for a
current drug conviction based on a past drug conviction that does not
violate Rule 404(b).361 The Sixth Circuit understood as much and correctly
prohibited this type of 404(b) evidence in Jenkins.362
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, permits this exact type of
evidence.363 The Seventh Circuit held that the government is free to reject
a proffered stipulation and introduce 404(b) evidence of one’s past drug
conviction because the stipulation does not have the same evidentiary
richness as the 404(b) evidence.364 The court held that a stipulation does
not have the same force as does sharing with the jury that a defendant, on
trial for drug possession and distribution, has previously been convicted of
the same crime.365 This is undoubtedly true, but the richness or force of the
404(b) evidence causes prejudice by showing that the defendant has a
propensity for committing the crime for which he is on trial.366 The past
drug conviction played no part in the current crime and should not be part
of the story that the prosecution wants to tell.367 Rule 404(b) evidence is
supposed to be permitted when it is needed to prove an element of a crime,
but if the element can be proved in a less prejudicial way—such as by
stipulation—then it is not necessary to the prosecution’s narrative and
should be excluded.368

357. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
358. See Duane, supra note 182, at 464 (suggesting that this extreme distinction might
have been the price the majority paid to acquire Justice Kennedy’s vote); see also
Thompson, supra note 47, at 72.
359. See supra notes 354, 356 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
361. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 218.
362. See supra notes 257–61 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 287–92 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s holding in
United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2001)).
364. See supra notes 287–92 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 287–92 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 354–56 and accompanying text.
368. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 245.
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B. New Approach to 404(b) Evidence
The foregoing discussion does not mean that 404(b) evidence should
never be admissible. There are many cases in which the defense does
dispute an element or refuses to stipulate to an element and 404(b) evidence
is needed for the government to meet its burden of proof. This Note does
not suggest that the government cannot prove its case in the way it sees fit,
but it does take the position, similar to the Second Circuit, that an
unequivocal stipulation to an element coupled with a “must convict” jury
instruction is sufficient to meet the prosecution’s burden of proof on that
element. Part III.B.1 suggests a new unifying rule on when to admit or
exclude 404(b) evidence. Part III.B.2 provides a guideline for issuing
limiting instructions when the court concludes that it is necessary to admit
404(b) evidence.
1. 404(b) Evidence on the Rule 403 Admissibility Scale
In general, the Second Circuit’s approach to admission of 404(b)
evidence is more sensitive to the prejudicial effects of 404(b) evidence than
some of its counterparts.369 The court still relies on its pre-Old Chief test,
while taking cognizance of Old Chief’s holdings.370 A new method for
when to admit 404(b) evidence should be based off of the Second Circuit’s
approach.
If the prosecution wants to admit 404(b) evidence, the first step is to
determine if the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b).371 This Note is
not suggesting a change to the circuit tests for whether a piece of evidence
is admissible under this rule.372 The second step is for the trial judge to
determine if the 404(b) evidence is admissible under Rule 403.373 In order
to truly balance the evidence’s probative worth with its potential prejudicial
effect, the judge should do so at the conclusion of the defendant’s case-inchief.374 This allows the judge to determine how necessary the evidence is
for the prosecution to meet its burden of proof, which is the only way to
properly weigh it against its prejudicial effect.375 In addition, if the issue is
simply undisputed in the defendant’s case-in-chief, the defendant has two
options: first, leave the issue undisputed and let the judge analyze the
404(b) evidence under the Rule 403 balancing test; or, second, offer an
unequivocal stipulation to the element, acknowledging that the judge would
be justified in sustaining objections to any cross examination or jury
argument on the issue and in instructing the jury that if it finds all other
elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then it “must convict” the
369. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 270–77 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 20, 27 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
374. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1980).
375. See id.; see also supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the
Eighth Circuit adopted this approach in United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284 (8th Cir.
1985)).
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defendant.376 In these instances, a “must convict” jury instruction is
necessary to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof on that
element.377
This test allows the judge ample discretion if the element is simply
undisputed, but removes discretion if there is an unequivocal stipulation. A
stipulation, after all, is good evidence.378 The question the judge must ask
is: Does the stipulation give the prosecution everything it needs regarding
the element?379 If it does, then the 404(b) evidence should be excluded.380
If it does not, then the defense should stipulate to whichever point of the
element it fails to meet, and if they refuse, then the stipulation should be
subjected to the Rule 403 balancing test.381
The concern that a jury might hold it against the prosecution if the
prosecution does not present evidence that meets the jury’s expectations
seems unfounded.382 Any “failure” by the prosecution to present this type
of evidence is explained; the judge informs the jury that the point was
admitted as true by the defense and grants the defense’s motion to order the
prosecution not to present evidence on the point.383 The jury should care
more about the fact that the element is proven than about how it was
proved.384
Finally, if the defense refuses to stipulate to the element and the judge is
left balancing the evidence’s prejudicial effect against its probative worth,
the judge should determine the probative value of 404(b) evidence by
evaluating how necessary it is for the prosecution’s story.385 This should
include analyzing if the evidence is needed to prove a disputed element and
should prohibit factoring in the evidence’s ability to persuade the jury to
make a moral judgment or mistaking its relevance to the defendant’s

376. See Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 938–39.
377. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text (explaining that a “must convict”
jury instruction is more effective and easier to follow than a limiting instruction and should
be issued to exclude 404(b) evidence rather than permitting 404(b) evidence and issuing a
limiting instruction).
378. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,186 (1997); see also supra note 184
and accompanying text.
379. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 245.
380. See Walton, supra note 35, at 1087 (noting that the only legitimate purpose of
evidence is ultimately to prove the disputed issues); see also supra note 284 and
accompanying text.
381. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
382. See Duane, supra note 182, at 465–66 (“[Old Chief] cites no authority to support that
proposition, and common sense squarely repudiates it. No sane jury would ever draw an
adverse inference against a party when the jury was given a sensible and uncontradicted
explanation for the absence of proof on a point.”); see also supra note 224 and
accompanying text.
383. See Duane, supra note 182, at 467 (“No other explanation or excuse could possibly
be any more compelling or direct.”).
384. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. In contrast to Donnie L. Kidd’s belief, a
voter certainly cares more about who won an election than the story about how the
candidates got to where they are now. See id.
385. See supra Part I.C.1.b. (explaining the narrow holding of Old Chief).
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character with its relevance to the actual story of the current crime.386 If the
evidence does add to the narrative of the currently alleged crime in a way
that is not already available, and it is not outweighed by its prejudicial
effect, then it may be permitted.387 The 404(b) evidence cannot add to the
narrative, however, by providing an “evidentiary richness” that invites the
jury to make character inferences.388 A limiting jury instruction is no cure
for what goes on subconsciously in a juror’s mind.389
2. The Effect of Limiting Jury Instructions
Although limiting instructions cannot erase what one has learned,390
courts continually use them under the guise that the jury will be able to do
just that.391 Logic indicates that a jury is not capable of using evidence in
solely the way the judge proscribes, simply ignoring it when it comes to the
general question of guilt.392 In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence
require that trial judges consider the lack of effectiveness in limiting
instructions when weighing the 404(b) evidence on the Rule 403 balancing
scale.393
The lack of effectiveness of limiting instructions is abundantly clear
when one looks at some of the limiting instructions courts issue when
permitting 404(b) evidence at trial. For instance, in Jenkins, the district
court instructed the jury to use the 404(b) evidence “to the extent that [it]
may determine [the testimony] might be relevant to the issue of
knowledge.”394 Besides the fact that this instruction is unclear, it
diminishes the possibility that the 404(b) evidence is even probative in the
first place.395 The Sixth Circuit correctly overturned the lower court in this
case, holding that a limiting instruction is not a magic potion that can cure
the prejudicial effects of 404(b) evidence.396
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s admission of
404(b) evidence in Williams, holding that a limiting instruction informing
the jury that it should consider the testimony “on the question of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity and absence of

386. Compare supra notes 225, 232 (demonstrating how the D.C. and Eighth Circuits
incorrectly analyzed 404(b) evidence in overturning their jurisprudence), with supra note
261 (demonstrating how the Sixth Circuit excludes 404(b) evidence if the evidence is only
probative of character); see also supra notes 366–68 and accompanying text.
387. See supra Part I.C.1.B; see also supra notes 266–77 and accompanying text
(demonstrating the Second Circuit’s execution of this formula).
388. See supra notes 225, 232, 261, 366–68 and accompanying text.
389. See infra Part III.B.2.
390. See supra notes 137, 256, 366–68 and accompanying text.
391. See LEONARD, supra note 118, § 1.11.5; see also supra note 136 and accompanying
text.
392. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
394. United States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928, 933 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see
also supra note 253 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 253–56 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 253–56 and accompanying text.
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mistake or accident” was sufficient.397 This type of instruction is too
confusing for even someone well versed in the law to understand, let alone
the average citizen.398 If 404(b) evidence is permitted at trial, then the
judge needs to ensure that a clear, understandable limiting instruction is
given.399
A limiting instruction would be more effective if it directly referenced
the prohibition on using any evidence to make inferences about one’s
character or that the defendant acted in character in the currently alleged
crime.400 The judge should explain that “it does not follow from a
defendant’s past acts that he committed the particular crime charged in the
[present] case.”401 Finally, the judge should explain that making this type
of character inference does not help the prosecution meet its burden of
proof and if that inference is needed for a juror to conclude guilt, then it is
not sufficient.402 A limiting instruction meeting these parameters would at
least ensure that the jury understands why the judge is asking it to do the
impossible.403 This type of instruction, combined with the test laid out in
Part III.B.1, should provide a more reasonable approach to the admission of
404(b) evidence.
CONCLUSION
The standards among the lower courts on when to admit 404(b) evidence
at trial are inconsistent. While most circuits include a Rule 403 analysis in
their tests for admissibility, its implementation in practice is less certain.
When a defendant offers to concede to an element that the 404(b) evidence
is meant to prove, the standards are even murkier. Old Chief resolved the
conflict among the lower courts as to the status element, but it also
introduced the concepts of narrative integrity and evidentiary richness,
opening the door for lower courts to stray further away from what Rules
404(b) and 403 stand for. Trial courts should reevaluate their test for
404(b) admissibility under Rule 403 and adopt a method that accepts
unequivocal stipulations and a “must convict” jury instruction as sufficient
alternative evidence for meeting the prosecution’s burden of proof on an
element. In the absence of alternative proof, trial courts should reconsider
the efficacy of limiting jury instructions and make sure to provide
constructive and clear instructions to the jury when they are necessary.

397. United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2001); see also supra note
294 and accompanying text.
398. See LEONARD, supra note 118, § 1.11.5.
399. See id.
400. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 860–61 (7th Cir. 2014); see also supra
note 298 and accompanying text.
401. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860–61.
402. See id.
403. See id.

